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Model	Choice	and	Crucial	Tests.	On	the	Empirical	Epistemology	
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Abstract:	Our	paper	discusses	the	epistemic	attitudes	of	particle	physicists	on	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	at	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	(LHC).	It	is	based	on	questionnaires	and	interviews	made	shortly	before	and	shortly	after	the	discovery	in	2012.	We	show,	to	begin	with,	that	the	discovery	of	a	Standard	Model	(SM)	Higgs	boson	was	less	expected	than	is	sometimes	assumed.	Once	the	new	particle	was	shown	to	have	properties	consistent	with	SM	expectations	–	albeit	with	significant	experimental	uncertainties	–,	there	was	a	broad	agreement	that	‘a’	Higgs	boson	had	been	found.	Physicists	adopted	a	two-pronged	strategy.	On	the	one	hand,	they	treated	the	particle	as	a	SM	Higgs	boson	and	tried	to	establish	its	properties	with	higher	precision;	on	the	other	hand,	they	searched	for	any	hints	of	physics	beyond	the	SM.	This	motivates	our	first	philosophical	thesis:	the	Higgs	discovery,	being	of	fundamental	importance	and	establishing	a	new	kind	of	particle,	represented	a	crucial	experiment	if	one	interprets	this	notion	in	an	appropriate	sense.	By	embedding	the	LHC	into	the	tradition	of	previous	precision	experiments	and	the	experimental	strategies	thus	established,	Duhemian	underdetermination	is	kept	at	bay.	Second,	our	case	study	suggests	that	criteria	of	theory	(or	model)	preference	should	be	understood	as	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values	that	have	to	be	weighed	in	factual	research	practice.	The	Higgs	discovery	led	to	a	shift	from	pragmatic	to	epistemic	values	as	regards	the	mechanisms	of	electroweak	symmetry	breaking.	Complex	criteria,	such	as	naturalness,	combine	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values,	but	are	coherently	applied	by	the	community.			
1.	Introduction3		The	discovery	of	a4	Higgs	boson	at	the	Large	Hadron	Collider	(LHC)	of	the	European	Laboratory	CERN,	announced	in	July	2012,	is	arguably	one	of	the	most	important																																																									1	Bergische	University	of	Wuppertal,	Department	of	Mathematics	and	Natural	Science,	Gaußstrasse	20,	42119	Wuppertal;	now	at	Department	of	Physics	and	Astronomy,	University	of	Bonn,	Nussallee	12,	53115	Bonn,	Germany;	Email:	peter.mattig@cern.ch.	2	Department	of	Philosophy,	University	of	South	Carolina,	Columbia,	SC	29208,	USA;	Email:	stoeltzn@sc.edu.	3	The	study	was	performed	as	part	of	the	project	‘Model	Dynamics’	supported	by	the	DFG	(project	no.	MA	2793/2-1).	It	is	based	on	questionnaires	that	were	developed	by	the	authors,	Arianna	Borrelli,	Robert	Harlander,	and	Friedrich	Steinle,	and	interviews	conducted	by	Arianna	Borrelli.	Karsten	Egger	assisted	in	the	evaluation	of	the	questionnaire.	We	acknowledge	the	help	of	Annette	Holtkamp	in	obtaining	the	SPIRES	email	list.		We	acknowledge	discussions	within	the	recently	established	DFG	Research	Unit	‘Epistemology	of	the	LHC’	and	detailed	comments	by	Robert	Harlander,	Martin	King,	and	Gregor	Schiemann.	Some	other	results	from	this	study	can	be	found	in	(Borrelli	2016)	and	her	presentation	at	CERN	available	under	https://indico.cern.ch/event/232108/.	We	thank	the	anonymous	referees	for	their	most	helpful	criticism	and	manifold	suggestions.	We	thank	Sophie	Ritson	for	having	made	us	aware	of	Baetu	(2017).	
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scientific	achievements	of	the	past	few	decades.	The	discovery	received	world-wide	attention;	two	of	the	inventors	of	the	Higgs	mechanism,	François	Englert	and	Peter	Higgs,	were	awarded	the	2013	Nobel	Prize	in	physics.	The	Higgs	boson	had	been	the	final	piece	of	the	so-called	Standard	Model	of	particle	physics	(SM)	not	observed	by	previous	experiments.	The	Higgs	mechanism	in	the	SM	was	required	to	generate	masses	of	the	elementary	particles	in	a	consistent	way.	Even	though	with	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson,	the	SM	–	terminology	notwithstanding	–	has	now	become	one	of	the	most	successful	scientific	theories	of	contemporary	physics,	all	particle	physicists	agree	that	it	will	not	be	the	final	word.	There	are	both	compelling	internal	and	external	reasons	to	postulate	physics	beyond	the	SM	(BSM).		In	retrospect,	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	might	seem	to	be	just	the	final	step	in	a	long	series	of	discoveries	and	precision	tests	in	which	stronger	and	stronger	accelerator	experiments	confirmed	all	particles	of	the	SM	and	scrutinized	their	interactions.	The	present	paper	argues	that	as	regards	the	community	of	elementary	particle	physics	this	picture	needs	qualification.	In	actual	fact,	even	shortly	before	the	Higgs	discovery	a	significant	percentage	of	physicists	raised	concerns	whether	it	would	at	all	be	found	at	the	LHC	and	expressed	preferences	for	other	explanations	of	the	particle	masses.			In	this	paper,	results	of	questionnaires	and	interviews	with	LHC	physicists	shortly	before	(autumn	2011)	and	shortly	after	(autumn	2012)	the	discovery	are	presented	and	analysed.	From	these	empirical	sources,	we	reconstruct	the	physicists’	beliefs	in	the	adequacy	of	certain	models,	in	the	outcome	of	the	LHC	experiments,	and	concerning	the	possible	impacts	of	the	LHC	experiments	on	those	models.	This	will	help	us	to	understand	the	epistemic	attitudes	of	particle	physicists,	and	the	principles	and	strategies	guiding	their	research.	Our	empirically	informed	epistemological	investigation	also	promises	new	insights	for	a	philosophical	analysis	of	how	actual	and	expected	experimental	findings,	on	the	one	side,	and	pragmatic	quality	criteria	of	models,	on	the	other,	influence	the	research	agendas	of	particle	physicists.		We	have	limited	the	scope	of	the	present	paper	to	a	specific	part	of	the	empirical	material	available	in	the	questionnaires	and	interviews:	to	the	Higgs	mechanism	and	competing	accounts	of	mass	generation,	and	to	the	presently	most	discussed	pragmatic	quality	criterion,	naturalness.	It	must	be	said,	however,	that	the	LHC	was,	from	the	very	beginning,	designed	not	only	to	search	for	the	Higgs	boson	but	also	to	probe	the	deep	TeV	energy	range	and	find	signs	of	BSM	physics.	Whereas	the	first	objective	has	now	been	achieved,	no	‘new	physics’	BSM	has	been	observed	to	date.5			The	specific	descriptive	questions	addressed	in	this	paper	are	as	such:			1. Did	physicists	in	2011	expect	the	Higgs	boson	to	be	discovered	at	the	LHC	and	how	did	they	evaluate	the	Higgs	candidate	in	2012,	that	is,	before	its	properties	were	known	to	a	sufficient	extent?	What	was	their	assessment	of	alternative	models	for	mass	generation	in	2011	and	in	2012?	2. How	important	was	the	naturalness	problem,	a	major	guiding	principle	to	develop	models	of	physics	beyond	the	SM	(BSM),	in	shaping	physicists’	attitudes	and	preferences?		We	will	show	that,	in	2011,	physicists	were	rather	undecided	whether	the	SM	Higgs																																																																																																																																																															4	We	adopt	the	usual	terminology	and	address	the	SM	Higgs	as	‘the’	Higgs,	whereas	those	models	with	a	potentially	more	complicated	Higgs	sector	as	containing	‘a’	Higgs	boson.		5	The	attempts	at	finding	physics	BSM	and	their	effects	on	the	thinking	of	LHC	physicists	will	be	discussed	in	a	separate	paper.	
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boson	would	eventually	be	found,	that	is,	even	a	few	months	before	the	first	evidence	was	reported.	However,	once	a	candidate	had	been	observed	in	2012,	they	quickly	embraced	the	notion	that	‘a’	Higgs	boson	had	been	found.	Its	discovery	immediately	affected	the	research	directions	in	particle	physics.	The	experimental	results	pulled	in	different	directions	as	regards	the	naturalness	problem.	There	was,	on	the	one	hand,	less	motivation	to	search	for	alternatives	to	the	Higgs	mechanism.	On	the	other	hand,	after	finding	the	Higgs	boson,	the	naturalness	problem	posed	by	the	scalar	Higgs	particle	changed	from	a	virtual	into	a	real	problem,	that	is,	there	existed	empirical	results	directly	relevant	for	it.	But	since	2012	no	BSM	effect	to	cure	this	problem	has	been	found.	This	has	led	some	physicists	to	develop	a	more	critical	attitude	as	to	naturalness’	significance	for	elementary	particle	physics.			The	physical	developments	prompt	the	following	philosophical	questions.		3. What	do	the	epistemic	attitudes	of	particle	physicists	shown	in	the	questionnaire	and	the	interviews	mean	for	the	significance	and	application	of	criteria	of	theory	(or	model)	6	choice	and	the	principles	and	epistemic	values	guiding	model	development?	4. What	does	the	comparison	of	the	situations	before	and	after	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	signify	for	the	relationship	between	theory	(or	models)	and	experiment?	In	particular,	was	the	Higgs	discovery	a	crucial	experiment	for	the	SM?		The	paper	is	organised	as	follows.	After	a	brief	introduction	into	the	theoretical	motivation	for	the	Higgs	mechanism	and	the	experimental	attempts	to	find	evidence	for	a	Higgs	boson	(Section	2),	we	provide	the	background	of	the	philosophical	problems	raised	(Section	3)	and	discuss	the	methodology	of	our	study	(Section	4).	The	presentation	of	the	results	will	be	subdivided	into	the	outcomes	of	the	questionnaire	and	the	interviews	in	2011	(Section	5)	and	in	2012	(Section	6)	respectively.	Finally	(Section	7),	we	outline	our	answers	to	the	above-mentioned	four	questions.			
2.	The	physics	of	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	
	Several	articles	of	both	physicists	and	philosophers	discuss	the	emergence	of	what	is	by	now	called	the	’Higgs’	mechanism	(Cf.	Ellis,	Gaillard,	Nanopoulos,	2015;	Nobel	laudatio	2013;	Karaca	2013b).	Here,	only	a	brief	account	of	the	motivation	and	the	concepts	behind	the	Higgs	boson	can	be	given.	In	the	early	1960s,	various	models	were	developed	to	unify	two	interactions	governing	the	subnuclear	world,	the	electromagnetic	and	the	weak	ones.	These	unifications	adopted	the	concept	of	local	gauge	symmetry	that	had	previously	been	applied	successfully	to	quantum	electrodynamics	(QED).	In	brief,	this	symmetry	means	that	the	theory	is	invariant	under	a	specific	space-time	dependent	transformation	of	the	quantum	fields.	Assuming	this	symmetry	in	the	SM	leads	to	a	consistent	interacting	field	theory,	which	for	particle	physicists	means	free	of	any	infinities	after	renormalization.		However,	a	major	problem	that	physicists	were	facing	in	applying	local	gauge	symmetry	to	weak	interactions	was	that	observations	implied	that	the	corresponding	gauge	bosons	have	a	non-vanishing	mass.	As	such,	gauge	boson	masses	break	the	symmetry	explicitly,	thus	leading	to	theoretical	inconsistencies,	such	as	the	violation	of	unitarity.	To	remedy	this,	in	the	1960s,	physicists	used	the	concept	of	spontaneous	symmetry	breaking	(SSB)	to	generate	gauge	boson	masses	in	a	gauge	invariant	way	at	the	cost	of																																																									6	In	line	with	the	current	philosophical	literature,	we	consider	models	as	autonomous	entities	in	scientific	theorizing,	not	as	the	logical	models	of	a	theory.	For	how	one	can	apply	this	conception	to	elementary	particle	physics,	cf.	Borrelli	&	Stöltzner	(2013)	and	Stöltzner	(2014).	
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introducing	an	additional	scalar,	i.e.	spin-less,	particle,	which	became	known	as	the	Higgs	boson.	This	particle	was	discovered	at	the	LHC	some	50	years	after	its	invention.	The	Higgs	sector	of	the	SM	is	a	novel	element	in	physics,	in	that	it	describes	the	mass	of	elementary	particles	in	terms	of	their	interaction	with	an	elementary	scalar	field.		Whereas	the	weak	and	the	electromagnetic	components	of	the	‘electroweak’	theory	have	almost	the	same	strength	at	very	high	energies,	they	are	substantially	different	at	low	energies,	since	only	the	weak	interaction	invokes	a	massive	interacting	particle.	Therefore,	the	mechanism	of	mass	generation	is	also	referred	to	as	’electroweak	symmetry	breaking’	(EWSB).	The	Higgs	mechanism	was	originally	only	devised	to	give	mass	to	the	weak	gauge	bosons	W+/-	and	Z0.	(The	latter	represents	the	electrically	neutral	component	of	the	weak	interaction,	which,	however,	has	an	admixture	of	an	electromagnetic	component.)	It	turned	out	that	the	Higgs	mechanism	could	also	be	applied	to	give	masses	to	fermions,	through	a	Yukawa	interaction,	albeit	without	predicting	their	numerical	values.		
	
2.1	The	experimental	search	for	the	Higgs	boson	
	The	general	conception	of	the	Higgs	mechanism	just	outlined	was	developed	into	phenomenological	predictions7	opening	the	way	for	experimental	searches	of	the	Higgs	boson.	Given	the	masses	of	the	W	and	Z	bosons,	the	Higgs	mechanism	introduced	just	one	additional	parameter	to	the	SM	that	had	to	be	determined	by	experiment,	notably	by	measuring	the	Higgs	mass8.	Whereas	the	theory	did	not	provide	a	prediction	for	this	mass,	it	did	lead	to	an	upper	bound	of	800	GeV	to	maintain	theoretical	consistency.	Depending	on	its	mass,	it	could	be	unambiguously	predicted	how	the	Higgs	boson	is	produced	and	the	way	it	can	be	seen	by	experiments.	Since	a	Higgs	boson	would	only	exist	for	small	fractions	of	a	second,	it	would	decay,	depending	on	its	mass,	mainly	into	massive	fermions	and	W	and	Z	bosons.		
	As	a	result,	a	clear	strategy	for	finding	the	Higgs	boson	was	devised.9	However,	this	did	not	make	Higgs	searches	easy.	Essentially	no	experiment	before	the	start	of	CERN’s	Large	Electron	Positron	Collider	(LEP)	in	1989	was	sensitive	to	the	Higgs	boson.	At	the	end	of	the	LEP	data	taking	no	significant	signal	was	observed.	However,	the	sensitivity	of	LEP	was	such	that	a	Higgs	of	114.4	GeV	or	less	should	have	been	found,	allowing	physicists	to	place	a	lower	limit	on	the	SM	Higgs	mass.	Between	the	end	of	LEP	and	the	start	of	LHC,	an	additional	small	mass	interval	around	160	GeV	could	be	excluded	at	the	Tevatron.	The	outstanding	precision	of	the	LEP	data	and	theoretical	calculations	based	on	the	SM	provided	an	indirect	sensitivity	to	the	Higgs	mass	by	quantum	fluctuations,	e.g.	loop	corrections	to	the	W	and	Z	bosons,	bounding	it	to	be	lighter	than	157	GeV.			In	2010,	data	taking	at	the	LHC	started	for	the	final	assault.	It	was	clear	that	the	LHC	had	the	sensitivity	to	observe	the	Higgs	boson	in	the	remaining	allowed	mass	range,	using	the	decay	modes	that	were	unambiguously	predicted	for	a	SM	Higgs.	Relatively	soon	one	could	exclude	a	high	mass	Higgs	of	200-600	GeV	–	in	full	agreement	with	LEP’s	indirect	limits.	With	the	rapid	increase	in	data	rate,	both	the	ATLAS	and	CMS	experiments																																																									7	Cf.	Ellis,	Gaillard,	Nanopoulos	(1976).	8	More	precisely,	the	Higgs	potential	has	two	parameters,	one	of	which	is	related	to	the	masses	of	the	W	and	Z	–	bosons	and	connected	to	the	vacuum	expectation	value	v	leaving	one	additional	parameter	that	had	not	been	determined	before	the	Higgs	discovery.	It	should	be	noted	that	in	the	SM	the	Yukawa	couplings	g,	i.e.	the	Higgs	couplings	to	the	fermions	are	given	by	g=sqrt(2)*mf/v,	mf	being	the	mass	of	the	fermion.	Therefore,	the	Yukawa	couplings	re-express	the	fermion	masses	but	are	not	counted	as	extra	free	parameters.	9	One	publication	was	even	titled	“The	Higgs	Hunter’s	Guide”	(Gunion	et	al.	1990).		
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reported,	at	a	CERN	colloquium	on	December	13,	2011,	an	excess	of	events	that	could	be	taken	as	initial	evidence	for	a	new	particle	around	126	GeV.	On	the	other	hand,	the	probability	that	this	would	be	just	a	background	fluctuation	was	still	too	high	to	claim	an	observation.	However,	half	a	year	later	much	more	data	had	been	accumulated,	such	that	both	detectors	presented,	at	a	special	CERN	seminar,	a	signal	of	5	standard	deviations	each.	The	data	correspond	to	a	background	fluctuation	probability	of	about	10-9,	where	the	background	is	considered	as	SM	without	Higgs.	By	convention	in	particle	physics,	this	was	sufficiently	small	to	claim	a	discovery,	an	observation.10	A	few	weeks	later,	the	two	experiments	published	their	data.	(Aad	et	al.	2012,	Chatrchan	et	al.	2012).			Still,	the	data	were	not	sufficient	to	definitely	claim	this	to	be	the	long-awaited	Higgs	boson.	Some	important	properties	had	not	yet	been	confirmed,	and	the	precision	of	the	measurements	on	production	and	decay	properties	was	still	marginal.	On	the	other	hand,	those	properties	that	were	observed	corresponded	to	what	is	expected	for	a	SM	Higgs	boson.	For	instance,	the	particle	had	been	found	in	two	decay	modes	with	rates	consistent	with	the	expectation,	and	it	had	a	mass	in	agreement	with	the	direct	and	indirect	limits	known	from	previous	experiments.	As	of	today	(2017),	more	properties	of	the	discovered	particle	have	been	studied,	the	decay	modes	and	the	mass	have	been	measured	to	higher	precision,	in	accordance	with	the	SM.	Even	though	there	is	still	need	for	further	measurements,	the	majority	among	physicists	now	considers	the	new	particle	is	indeed	the	Higgs	boson.		
	
2.2	Alternatives	to	the	Higgs	boson	
	Already	shortly	after	the	invention	of	the	Higgs	mechanism,	several	authors	expressed	discontent	because	this	solution	of	the	SSB	problem	appeared	largely	ad-hoc.	For	example,	it	has	limited	predictive	power	in	that	it	cannot	determine	the	quark	and	lepton	masses.	Concern	was	also	raised	that	the	Higgs	mechanism	introduces	a	new	concept	into	the	theory	for	the	one	and	only	purpose	of	mass	generation.	Over	the	years,	the	list	of	issues	cited	by	physicists	in	this	respect	has	expanded.	(Cf.	Friederich,	Harlander,	&	Karaca	2014,	sect.	3).				Several	alternative	mechanisms	of	EWSB	have	emerged	over	the	past	decades.	They	used	a	scalar	particle	and	a	Higgs-like	potential	to	generate	mass.	However,	in	many	cases,	the	conceptual	framework	of	the	alternative	models	was	very	different	from,	and	implied	physics	beyond	the	SM.	These	BSM	models	will	be	considered	in	this	article	only	in	relation	to	mass	generation.			A	fairly	straightforward	modification	of	the	original	Higgs	mechanism	was	to	extend	the	Higgs	sector.	Originally,	one	complex	Higgs	doublet	was	assumed,	leading	to	four	fields	one	of	which	would	be	the	observable	Higgs	boson,	whereas	the	others	would	not	be	directly	observable.	However,	one	can	also	introduce,	e.g.,	a	second	doublet	leading	to	five	physical	elementary	Higgs	bosons	with	no	change	in	the	principal	mechanism	of	mass	generation.	Such	models	allow	the	different	Higgs	bosons	to	assume	different	roles.			The	two	Higgs	doublet	model	is	of	special	interest	in	BSM	considerations	since	it	is	the	minimally	required	Higgs	sector	in	the	framework	of	Supersymmetry,	the	most	often	discussed	extension	of	the	SM.	Supersymmetry	assumes	a	new	fundamental	symmetry	of	particles	with	integer	and	half-integer	spins.	In	the	context	of	LHC	physics,																																																									10	On	the	criteria	when	particle	physicists	claim	‚evidence’,	versus	‚observation’	or	‚exclusion’	see	the	'Prologue’	to	Franklin	(2013).	
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Supersymmetry	typically	is	studied	in	several	variants	of	the	MSSM	(‘minimal	supersymmetric	SM’)	that	contain	a	rather	broad	range	of	features	that	allow	one	solve	some	basic	problems	of	the	SM.	Among	those	is	providing	a	Dark	Matter	candidate	and	solving	the	naturalness	problem	(see	below).	Moreover,	the	MSSM	is	the	only	BSM	model	that	makes	a	firm	prediction	on	the	upper	limit	of	the	Higgs	mass:	it	has	to	be	lighter	than	about	130	GeV,	a	limit	that	is	much	tighter	than	the	range	allowed	by	the	SM.	(This	limit	of	130	GeV	is	valid	for	all	SUSY	models	considered	at	the	LHC	and	for	SUSY	scales	of	some	1	TeV.)11		Another	class	of	models	assumes	the	Higgs	boson	to	be	a	composite,	i.e.	made	up	of	sub-constituents.	The	first	model	of	this	kind	was	devised	at	the	end	of	the	1970s	by	essentially	copying	concepts	known	from	the	strong	interactions	that	explain	hadron	masses.	This	mechanism	was	dubbed	‘Technicolour’;	since	it	involved	strong	interactions,	it	was	considered	as	a	type	of	‘strong’	or	‘dynamical’	EWSB.	The	realisation	of	these	models	led	to	inconsistencies	with	measurements,	such	that	this	approach	by	now	has	become	disfavoured.	However,	the	concept	of	composite	Higgs	particles	has	been	implemented	within	multiple	frameworks	invoking	additional	symmetries,	new	interactions,	or	additional	spatial	dimensions	(e.g.	Csaki	and	Tanedo	2016).		All	these	alternative	models	assume	scalar	particles	like	the	SM	Higgs	boson	to	generate	the	masses	of	gauge	bosons	and	fermions.	However,	the	properties	of	these	scalars	are	different,	albeit	sometimes	by	a	rather	small	amount	given	by	tuneable	free	parameters.	All	of	them	also	lead	to	new	phenomena,	e.g.	more	scalars	and	more	fermions.			
2.3	The	Naturalness	problem		From	a	theoretical	perspective,	the	existence	of	an	elementary	scalar	Higgs	boson	introduces	an	’unnaturalness’	into	the	SM.	The	concept	‘naturalness’	was	introduced	in	slightly	different	forms	by	‘t	Hooft	(1979)	and	Susskind	(1979).	The	problem	itself	has	a	longer	history	(cf.	Giudice	2008)	and	reaches	beyond	the	context	of	the	Higgs	problem	(cf.	Giudice	2013).	During	the	past	decades,	naturalness	has	developed	from	a	merely	technical	problem	into	an	influential	guiding	principle	for	BSM	physics;	that	is,	extensions	of	the	SM	were	developed	with	the	explicit	aim	to	remedy	the	naturalness	problem.			In	a	nutshell,	the	naturalness	problem	is	this:	since	the	fundamental	equations	of	the	SM	can	only	be	solved	in	a	perturbative	expansion,	at	each	order	a	theoretically	well-defined	correction	has	to	be	applied	to	compensate	for	quantum	fluctuations	that	would	modify	a	physical	quantity	like	mass	or	charge.	Such	‘renormalisation’	is	a	standard	technical	procedure	in	theoretical	particle	physics.	For	the	SM	particles	of	spin	½	or	1	these	corrections	are	of	a	few	percent.	In	the	case	of	the	Higgs	boson,	which	is	a	scalar,	however,	the	correction	to	the	square	of	the	Higgs	mass	grows	quadratically	with	energy.		Introducing	a	cut-off	mass	where	the	theory	would	break	down,	leads	to	finite	corrections.	In	the	case	of	the	SM,	this	could	be	at	the	rather	high	Planck	scale,	where	gravity	becomes	important	and	the	SM	is	known	to	be	insufficient.	Assuming	such	a	scale	within	the	SM,	in	case	of	the	Higgs	mass,	makes	these	corrections	appear	‘dramatic	and	even	bizarre’	(Peskin	and	Schroeder	1995,	p.	788);	for	instance,	in	order	to	keep	the	square	of	the	Higgs	mass	at	its	measured	value	of	125	GeV,	corrections	have	to	be																																																									11	There	exists	a	small	(logarithmic)	dependence	of	this	bound	on	the	masses	of	the	SUSY	particles.	Even	if	more	Higgs	multiplets	exist,	the	bound	would	only	rise	to	150	GeV.	
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invoked	that	are	more	than	1030	times	higher	than	the	Higgs	mass	itself.	Furthermore,	these	corrections	have	to	be	fine-tuned	over	many	decimal	places.	Although	theoretically	viable	and	consistent,	the	magnitude	of	these	corrections	is	considered	‘unnatural’.	Once	this	correction	is	defined	the	theory	is	completely	consistent	and	any	dependence	on	the	scale	is	eliminated.			During	the	past	two	decades,	naturalness	has	arguably	become	the	most	influential	guiding	principle	for	constructing	and	motivating	BSM	models.	Or	more	specifically,	many	physicists	believed	that	if	a	SM	Higgs	boson	existed,	it	would	come	with	new	phenomena	to	keep	the	theory	‘natural’.	For	instance,	new	symmetries,	extra	spatial	dimensions,	or	a	composite	Higgs	boson	built	from	smaller	objects	would	avoid	unnaturalness.	Allowing	for	corrections	of	just	a	few	percent	–	as	for	the	other	sectors	of	the	SM	–	these	new	phenomena	should	be	in	the	mass	range	of	1	TeV	that	is	well	covered	by	the	LHC.	One	has	to	be	aware	that	there	is	no	clear	definition	of	when	a	theory	would	become	unnatural	and	there	is	a	large	freedom	how	much	fine	tuning	is	considered	acceptable.	Yet	once	a	bound	on	the	acceptable	fine	tuning	is	set,	it	determines	the	mass	range	at	which	new	phenomena	are	expected.	At	any	rate,	thus	far	there	has	neither	been	a	direct	observation	nor	any	clear	indirect	indication	from	precision	studies	that	such	a	new	effect	exists.				
3.	Philosophical	Background:	Theory	Choice	and	Crucial	Experiments		Our	empirical	study	allows	us	to	address	two	longstanding	problems	in	philosophy	of	science	from	the	perspective	of	the	actual	practice	of	scientists.	First	(in	3.2),	we	discuss	the	relationship	between	epistemic	and	pragmatic	(including	aesthetic)	criteria	of	theory	choice	in	the	contexts	of	models	of	electroweak	symmetry	breaking.	Presently	most	discussed	among	these	criteria	is	naturalness.	Second	(in	3.3.),	we	discuss	under	which	conditions	complex	experiments,	such	as	the	Higgs	discovery,	are	considered	decisive	or	even	crucial.	We	begin	this	section,	however,	by	showing	that	the	present	debates	about	naturalness	represent	a	case	in	point	about	the	influence	of	criteria	of	theory	choice.	The	general	aim	of	the	present	section	is	to	give	a	short	survey	of	the	current	philosophical	discussion	that	provides	the	basis	for	Section	7.						
3.1.	The	Philosophical	Challenge	of	Naturalness		Several	facets	of	the	naturalness	problem	have	attracted	philosophers’	attention;	among	them	are	its	precise	content	and	to	what	extent	it	influences	current	research	in	particle	physics.	Porter	Williams	(2015)	has	distinguished	four	(closely	related)	ways	to	formulate	the	naturalness	problem:	(i)	quadratic	divergences	in	renormalisation;	(ii)	‘t	Hooft’s	(1979)	suggestion	that	setting	a	small	parameter	to	zero	must	increase	the	symmetry	of	the	system;	(iii)	a	specific	version	of	the	problem	of	fine-tuning	of	fundamental	constants;	(iv)	an	aesthetic	criterion,	whose	force	is	derived	from	various	factors	prevailing	within	the	scientific	community.	Williams	argues	that	none	of	his	four	reformulations	captures	the	whole	naturalness	problem	and	believes	that	it	is	rather	an	expression	of	the	central	dogma	of	effective	field	theories	according	to	which	widely	separated	scales	should	eventually	decouple.			The	physicist	James	Wells	(2015)	considers	(i)	as	the	root	of	the	problem,	but	subsequently	emphasizes	the	significant	difference	between	the	technical	naturalness	(ii)	and	the	absolute	naturalness	involved	in	fine-tuning	that	eventually	goes	back	to	Dirac’s	classical	worries	about	large	dimensionless	numbers.	He	elaborates	an	example	of	an	exotically	augmented	quantum	electrodynamics	(QED)	that	consistently	
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instantiates	absolute	naturalness	at	the	expense	of	“more	parameters,	more	fields,	and	more	complexity	in	the	theory.”	(2015,	107)	He	admits	that	this	principle	is	controversial,	but	believes,	more	generally,	“that	in	the	era	of	the	Standard	Model’s	ascendancy,	the	influence	of	simplicity	and	Ockham’s	razor	to	theory	construction	has	paled	in	comparison	to	Naturalness.”	(2015,	104)	12		Grinbaum	(2012)	instead	has	argued	that	–	in	virtue	of	its	complex	nature	–	naturalness	is	exclusively	an	aesthetic	criterion.	Williams	(2015)	rejects	Grinbaum’s	interpretation	because	aesthetic	criteria	are	notoriously	ambiguous.	Supersymmetry,	for	instance,	is	considered	most	promising	by	many	physicists,	even	though	it	is	aesthetically	attractive	in	the	unbroken	state	but	aesthetically	unattractive	after	its	breaking	produces	a	large	number	of	new	constants.	Borrelli	(2015)	argues,	that	it	is	precisely	the	vagueness	of	the	concept	of	naturalness	that	allows	it	to	function	as	a	useful	common	narrative	of	the	different	subcultures	of	particle	physics,	the	experimentalists	and	theoreticians		The	goal	of	the	present	paper	is	not	to	analyse	all	facets	of	naturalness.	Instead	we	take	it	as	the	currently	most	important	example	of	a	guiding	principle	for	a	‘good’	model	within	contemporary	particle	physics	and	provide	empirical	results	about	its	relationship	with	other	guiding	principles.	More	specifically,	we	will	compare	the	relatively	new	and	quantitative	concept	of	naturalness	with	the	more	familiar	pragmatic,	aesthetic,	and	qualitative	criteria	of	elegance	and	simplicity	–	Ockham’s	razor	being	one	of	its	manifestations.			
3.2	Epistemic	and	pragmatic	criteria	of	theory	choice		Philosophers	have	traditionally	distinguished	epistemic	and	pragmatic	criteria	of	theory	choice	(or	preference).	The	former,	among	them	empirical	adequacy	and	theoretical	consistency,	are	held	to	be	rationally	compelling.	Pragmatic	criteria	have	instead	been	seen	as	a	way	to	decide	among	epistemically	equivalent	alternatives	by	appealing	to	a	theory’s	simplicity	or	other	aesthetic	features,	or	to	its	fruitfulness	for	further	research.	Among	the	classical	examples	are	the	choice	between	a	geocentric	and	a	heliocentric	world	view	at	the	time	of	Copernicus	and	the	early	philosophical	debates	about	the	nature	and	alleged	conventionality	of	space	and	time.	The	philosophical	significance	of	these	criteria	of	theory	choice	arises	from	the	problem	of	underdetermination	of	theory	by	empirical	evidence	that	Pierre	Duhem	illustrated	at	the	parallelism	between	Newton’s	corpuscular	theory	and	Huygens’s	wave	theory	of	light.	Duhem	argued	that	experimental	data	never	uniquely	determine	a	particular	hypothesis	because	setting	up	and	confirming	a	hypothesis	presupposes	the	correctness	of	many	other	hypotheses	including	the	theories	governing	the	measurement	devices.	If	one	accepts	some	version	of	the	underdetermination	argument,	pragmatic	and	aesthetic	criteria	become	more	relevant	or	even	inevitable.			Underdetermination	is	also	discussed	under	the	rubrics	of	theory-ladenness	of	data	or	–	following	Neurath	and	Quine	–	confirmational	holism.	This	means	that	any	experimental	result	confirms	or	refutes	both	the	theory	or	model	under	investigation	and	a	large	set	of	other	assumptions	that	are	assumed	to	be	true.	Especially	in	Quine’s	hands,	underdetermination	and	holism	took	a	logical	and	semantic	tack	that	not	only	ruled	out	that	empirical	evidence	could	deductively	entail	scientific	theories,	but	that	additionally	seemed	to	imply	that	any	theory	could	be	rationally	retained	in	the	face	of	recalcitrant	evidence.	Laudan	has	pointed	out	that,	while	the	latter	may	be	logically	possible,																																																									12	Ockham’s	razor	instructs	us	not	to	add	basic	entities	without	any	need	to	do	so.	It	has	originally	been	a	metaphysical	principle,	but	the	term	is	nowadays	used	more	broadly.	Cf.	the	following	section;	see	also	Wells	(2017).	
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scientists	do	not	act	“in	an	evaluative	vacuum.”	(1990,	276)	To	his	mind,	the	non-uniqueness	of	theory	resulting	from	Duhemian	underdetermination	can	be	accepted	without	adopting	an	egalitarian	approach	towards	rival	theories.	Laudan	and	Leplin,	more	generally,	held	“that	the	epistemic	bearing	of	evidence	on	theory	is	…	subject	to	reinterpretation	as	science	grows	and	may	be	indeterminate	at	a	particular	point	in	the	process	of	growth.”	(1991,	455)	Norton,	moreover,	has	argued	that	ampliative	inferences	remain	valid	if	underdetermination	focuses	locally,	“on	the	confirmation	of	hypotheses	by	scientists	in	actual	scientific	practice,”	(2008,	23)	rather	than	being	taken	as	a	global	challenge	to	its	rationality.	But	overall	the	topic	remains	controversial	(cf.	Stanford	2017).	Since	the	present	paper	is	concerned	with	the	analysis	of	experimental	and	theoretical	practice,	we	are	following	Laudan	in	focusing	on	the	scientific-practical	aspects	of	underdetermination	This	focus	on	scientific	practice	is	also	a	better	basis	for	assessing	the	role	of	pragmatic	and	epistemic	criteria	of	theory	choice	than	debates	about	the	rationality	of	science	globally.			Speaking	of	theory	choice,	philosophers	of	science	have	traditionally	set	pragmatic	criteria	firmly	apart	from	the	epistemic	criterion	of	empirical	adequacy	and	all	other	scientific	questions	that	can	be	resolved	within	an	explicitly	formulated	theoretical	framework	(cf.	Carnap	1950).	Thomas	S.	Kuhn	(1977)	rejected	this	separation	and	advocated	a	broader	list	of	characteristics	of	a	good	scientific	theory.	It	includes:	empirical	“accuracy,	consistency	[internally	and	with	respect	to	other	theories],	scope,	simplicity,	and	fruitfulness.”	(1977,	322)	These	five	criteria	of	theory	choice	are	not	mutually	independent;	they	are	often	context-dependent	and	may	point	in	opposite	directions.	For	instance,	an	increase	in	accuracy	can	trivially	be	obtained	by	adding	additional	parameters;	yet	scientists	may	prefer	to	make	ado	with	a	smaller	number	of	fundamental	quantities	–	or	with	a	simpler	law	–	even	at	the	expense	of	some	accuracy.	Thus,	scientists	have	to	assess	the	relative	weight	of	these	criteria	when	deployed	together.	Both	their	form	and	the	relative	weight,	to	Kuhn’s	mind,	contain	contextual	and	idiosyncratic	(psychological)	factors.	Kuhn	was	however	at	pains	to	argue	that	such	subjectivity	does	not	render	theory	choice	irrational	or	a	mere	matter	of	taste.	Theory	choice,	we	might	add,	was	not	a	major	battle	in	the	conflict	between	historical	rationality	and	historical	contingency	waged	during	the	1970s.	Kuhn’s	point	was	the	historical	and	factual	nature	of	theory	choice,	not	its	contingency	or	arbitrariness.	Historians	often	find	an	increasing	unanimity	of	individual	choices	in	a	certain	field.	Such	factual	unanimity	does	not	establish	rationally	binding	criteria	for	theory	choice.	Instead	of	being	rules	of	an	algorithm,	the	criteria	of	theory	choice	function	“as	values,	which	influence	it.	…;	they	do	specify	a	great	deal:	what	each	scientist	must	consider	in	reaching	a	decision.”	(1977,	331)13		Heather	Douglas	has	proposed	a	finer-grained	account	in	order	to	restore	the	separation	between	epistemic	and	pragmatic	cognitive	values	and	reduce	conflicts	between	them.	She	distinguishes	(i)	minimal	criteria	applied	to	the	theory	per	se,	among	them	internal																																																									13	Laudan	reads	Kuhn’s	analysis	of	theory	choice	against	the	backdrop	of	scientific	revolutions	that	represent	breaks	in	rational	justification.	This	rehearses,	to	Laudan’s	(1990)	mind,	the	holistic	and	egalitarian	reading	of	underdetermination	and	provides	a	justification	for	the	sociologizing	of	epistemology.	Without	entering	into	a	broader	Kuhn	debate,	it	seems	to	us	that	once	we	limit	ourselves	to	an	epistemic	or	local	understanding	of	underdetermination,	the	Kuhnian	analysis	of	the	values	of	a	good	scientific	theory	can	still	provide	important	insights	into	scientific	practice.	As	Kuhn	himself	has	emphasized,	these	values	are	only	one	element	of	theory	choice,	alongside	sociological	factors	and	inductive	reasoning.	Moreover,	our	goal	here	is	not	to	find	all	determinants	of	theory	choice,	but	to	focus	on	the	role	of	the	epistemic	and	pragmatic	criteria	or	values	in	the	preference	of	models	in	elementary	particle	physics.		
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consistency;	(ii)	minimal	criteria	applied	to	the	relation	of	theory	and	evidence,	among	them	empirical	adequacy;	(iii)	desiderata	applied	to	theories	per	se,	among	them	scope,	simplicity,	and	potential	explanatory	power	of	a	theory	that	largely	“fall	under	the	rubric	of	the	fruitfulness	of	the	theory”.	(2013,	p.	800);	(iv)	desiderata	applied	to	the	relation	of	theory	and	evidence,	among	them	being	supported	by	a	broad	range	of	empirical	evidence	and	not	being	contrived	to	match	a	small	domain	of	facts	in	an	ad	hoc	fashion.	While	the	values	in	categories	(i)	and	(ii)	are	epistemic,	category	(iii)	contains	“strategic	or	pragmatic	values”	(2013,	p.	800)	that	help	in	“deciding	which	theory	to	pursue	next”	(2013,	804)).	Instead,	group	(iv)	“provides	assurance	that	our	scientific	claims	are	more	likely	to	be	reliable.”	(2013,	p.	800)	Moreover:	“While	simplicity,	scope,	and	explanatory	power	are	often	thought	to	pull	against	each	other	when	considering	theories	alone	(group	iii),	they	pull	together	when	considering	a	theory	in	relation	to	evidence	(group	iv).”	(2013,	803)			Perhaps,	the	most	important	pragmatic	criterion	in	the	history	of	particle	physics	is	simplicity.	Most	influential	has	been	the	quest	for	a	simple	unified	theory	of	all	fundamental	forces.14	Simplicity	also	stands	behind	particle	physicists’	long-time	worries	about	the	many	parameters	that	are	needed	to	make	the	SM	empirically	adequate.	As	Baker	(2013)	rightly	observes,	it	is	quite	challenging	to	pin	down	the	notion	precisely.	Many	authors	distinguish	elegance	(typically	attributed	to	a	theory)	and	parsimony	(Ockham’s	razor	that	directs	us	not	to	introduce	unnecessary	entities).	Both	aspects	of	simplicity	may	come	into	conflict.	For	instance,	the	introduction	of	supersymmetric	partners	to	all	fundamental	particles	reduces	the	basic	components	into	chiral	super	multiplets,	thus	reducing	the	complexity	of	the	theory.	The	elegance	of	an	exact	symmetry	between	fermions	and	bosons	in	the	unbroken	theory	disappears	once	a	breaking	mechanism	is	introduced,	which	leads	to	a	large	number	of	additional	parameters.		From	the	interviews	and	questionnaires,	we	will	analyse	in	Sect	7.3	and	7.4	how	particle	physicists	understand	and	weigh	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values	and	how	they	assess	the	criterion	of	naturalness	in	BSM	models.	Applying	the	philosophical	debate	about	those	values	to	model	preferences	within	a	variegated	model	landscape	has	certain	consequences	on	how	to	interpret	such	preferences	further.	We	are	following	Kuhn	and	Douglas	in	speaking	about	values	rather	than	criteria,	and	will	also	speak	about	preference	instead	of	choice	even	in	cases,	such	as	supersymmetry	or	not,	where	the	latter	terminology	could	be	appropriate.			
3.3	Making	experiments	crucial		The	second	classical	philosophical	problem	relevant	for	the	present	paper	concerns	the	interaction	between	theory	(or	models)	and	experiment.	LHC’s	first	task	consisted	in	a	definitive	and	crucial	test	of	the	SM,	i.e.	to	find	the	Higgs	boson	or	exclude	its	existence.	Since	the	Higgs	boson	is	an	essential	part	of	the	SM	and	since	LHC	would	cover	the	whole	energy	scale	relevant	for	direct	searches,	not	finding	it	should	have	eventually	implied	that	the	SM	was	refuted.	Thus,	a	large	majority	of	elementary	particle	physicists	interviewed	expressed	the	conviction	that	a	Higgs	discovery	or	non-discovery	at	LHC	represented	a	crucial	and	decisive	test	for	the	SM.																																																											14	Note	that	some	philosophers	–	and	some	physicists,	perhaps	–	would	argue	that	there	are	metaphysical	reasons	or	some	a	priori	principle	of	rationality	that	imply	that	a	simpler	theory	is	more	likely	to	be	true.	Such	questions	are,	however,	outside	the	scope	of	the	present	paper.	
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This	widely	shared	conviction	among	physicists	prompts	the	question	whether	the	Higgs	discovery	represented	a	crucial	experiment	in	a	philosophical	perspective?	Let	us	take	a	closer	look.	The	term	‘crucial	experiment’	originated	with	Francis	Bacon	and	became	influential	through	Newton	and	his	demonstration	that	sunlight	consisted	of	rays	exhibiting	different	behaviours.	A	crucial	experiment,	in	this	traditional	understanding,	unambiguously	and	definitively	confirms	a	hypothesis	or	decides	between	rivalling	hypotheses.	Pierre	Duhem	objected	on	the	basis	of	the	underdetermination	argument.			This	philosophical	context	has	made	scholars	wary	about	crucial	experiments,	especially	if	they	understood	underdetermination	as	a	primarily	logical	and	global	problem	and	followed	Duhem	in	allowing	only	deductive	inferences	between	theories	and	data.	15	While	some	emphasized	that	falsifications	of	a	theory	were	more	likely	to	be	crucial	experiments	than	corroborations,	Lakatos	famously	objected	to	this	asymmetry	and	bluntly	stated:	“No	experiment	is	crucial	at	the	time	it	is	performed	(except	perhaps	psychologically).”	(1974,	320)	His	main	argument	was	that	the	assessment	of	each	experiment	can	only	be	performed	against	the	backdrop	of	the	entire	research	program	it	is	embedded	into	and	against	its	competitors.	Thus,	designating	an	experiment	as	crucial	is	partly	a	historical	assessment.			The	idea	that	a	crucial	experiment	is	embedded	into	a	broader	program	is	also	the	core	of	a	recent	debate	about	crucial	experiments	in	biology.	Weber	(2009)	defends	the	characterization	of	an	experiment	as	crucial,	not	within	the	traditional	contexts	of	deductive	reasoning	and	the	refutation	of	alternative	hypotheses,	but	by	developing	“an	experimentalist	version	of	inference	to	the	best	explanation.”	(2009,	21)	Hypotheses	are	not	refuted,	but	positively	selected	as	those	best	supported	by	the	evidence.	Weber’s	strategy	to	defend	the	Meselson-Stahl	experiment	as	crucial	is	now	to	show	that	both	parts	of	Duhem’s	problem,	the	problem	of	untested	auxiliaries	and	the	problem	of	an	exhaustive	partition	of	theoretical	alternatives	(including	the	unconceived	ones)16,	can	be	kept	at	bay.	To	this	end	he	develops	a	holistic	account	of	experimental	mechanism	that	includes	both	a	model	of	the	mechanisms	producing	the	phenomena	and	parts	of	the	experimental	system,	among	them	“the	characteristic	manipulations	and	measurement	devices	used.”	(2009,	34)	Baetu	(2017)	has	criticised	Weber’s	reconstruction	and	argued	that	the	Meselson-Stahl	experiment	was	inconclusive	for	the	hypotheses	considered.	Instead,	“it	was	part	of	a	broader	research	project	aiming	to	elucidate	the	mechanisms	of	DNA	replication”	(2017,	4.)	–	which	ultimately	led	to	the	development	of	new	experimental	techniques.	“Thus	understood,	the	experiment	extended	over	a	decade	or	more.	However,	the	crucial	experiment	account	attributes	all	or	most	of	the	impact	of	the	whole	series	of	experiments	to	a	single	set	of	experimental	results.”	(2017)	In	the	same	vein	as	Lakatos	put	it,	an	experiment	becomes	crucial	only	in	historical	reconstruction	and	within	the	context	of	a	broader	research	program.		We	believe	that	the	Weber-Baetu	debate	rightly	follows	the	trend	diagnosed	in	Sect.	3.2.	to	view	underdetermination	and	crucial	experiments	as	an	epistemic	and	factual	problem	rather	than	a	logical	and	semantic	one.	In	this	way,	the	first	aspect	of	Duhem’s	problem,	the	auxiliary	hypotheses,	becomes	embedded	into	an	experimental	research																																																									15	Note	that	Duhem	actually	believed	that	experiments	could	be	crucial.	But	this	could	not	be	inductively	inferred	from	the	data,	but	required	the	bon	sens	of	the	physicists.	While	bon	sens	might	have	been	a	useful	notion	in	Duhem’s	days,	it	seems	to	us	too	vague	for	large-scale	experiments	in	particle	physics.	At	best	one	might	take	bon	sense	as	an	umbrella	term	for	the	detailed	set	of	experimental	strategies	given	by	Franklin	(2013).		16	Cf.	Stanford	(2006)	who	shows	that	it	is	difficult	to	find	cases	where	the	underdetermination	was	not	eventually	resolved.	
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program.	The	reference	to	turn	to	in	the	present	context	is	of	course	Franklin’s	(2013)	philosophical	reconstruction	of	the	history	of	modern	particle	physics.	There	Franklin	distils	a	list	of	reliable	strategies	that	in	effect	allow	one	to	keep	Duhem’s	problem	at	bay	and	address	the	related	problem	of	theory-ladenness	of	large-scale	particle	experiments.	Beauchemin’s	(2017)	autopsy	of	measurements	with	the	ATLAS	detector17	can	be	read	as	a	continuation,	into	the	days	of	LHC,	of	Franklin’s	(2013)	history	of	the	reliable	experimental	strategies	and	rules	of	data	analysis	that	characterize	contemporary	elementary	particle	physics.	We	will	take	up	some	of	these	strategies	in	Section	7.2.	and	discuss	how	they	permit	us	to	consider	the	Higgs	discovery	as	a	crucial	experiment.	Let	us	however	first	assess	Franklin’s	assessment	of	crucial	experiments.			Franklin	and	Perovic	(2015)	compare	two	ground-breaking	particle	physics	experiments.	While	they	classify	the	discovery	of	parity	violation	as	a	crucial	experiment,	the	discovery	of	CP-violation	represented	only	a	‘persuasive	experiment’.	“The	difference	lies	in	the	length	and	complexity	of	the	derivation	linking	the	hypothesis	to	the	experimental	result,	or	to	the	number	of	auxiliary	hypotheses	required	for	the	derivation.”	(2015,	85)	Indeed,	physicists	had	speculated	about	parity	violation	before,	and	the	observed	effect	was	maximal.	CP-violation	was	completely	unexpected,	but	most	theoreticians	quickly	settled	for	it.	Franklin	and	Perovic	consider	this	acceptance	as	a	“pragmatic	solution	of	the	Duhem-Quine	problem.”	(2015,	84).	In	the	case	of	the	Stern-Gerlach	experiment,	as	reconstructed	by	Franklin	and	Perovic,	the	diagnosis	of	cruciality	underwent	several	changes.	By	discovering	the	space	quantization	[Richtungsquantelung]	predicted	by	the	Bohr-Sommerfeld	quantum	theory,	it	became	a	crucial	watershed	between	classical	and	quantum	physics,	but	not	by	confirming	the	latter	theory.	For	what	Stern	and	Gerlach	actually	measured	was	a	new	quantum	phenomenon,	electron	spin,	that	was	only	postulated	after	the	experiment.	Thus,	the	experiment	“was	regarded	as	crucial	at	the	time	it	was	performed,	but,	in	fact,	wasn’t.	…	A	new	theory	[quantum	mechanics]	was	proposed	and	although	the	Stern-Gerlach	result	initially	also	posed	problems	for	the	new	theory,	after	a	modification	of	that	new	theory	[the	integration	of	spin],	the	result	confirmed	it.	In	a	sense,	it	was	crucial	after	all.	It	just	took	some	time.”	(2015,	40-41)18			These	examples	also	indicate	that	establishing	experimental	evidence	and	deciding	whether	an	experiment	is	conclusive	or	even	crucial,	is	largely	a	factual	question	and	involves	different	time	scales.	Acquiring	precision	data	sometimes	represents	a	long-term	process	that	involves	previous	experiments	and	is	continued	in	the	experiment	itself.	The	actual	discovery	of	a	particle	instead	represents	a	precisely	dated	event;	scientists	decide	after	a	detailed	statistical	analysis	that	the	evidence	is	sufficient.			Using	the	Higgs	discovery,	in	7.2	we	will	argue	that	the	diagnosis	of	Franklin	and	Perovic	seems	to	us	counterintuitive	because	it	makes	the	characterization	of	an	experiment	as	crucial	or	not	depend	on	short-term	development	of	scientific	theorizing.	In	Section	7.2.,	we	will	provide	a	different	characterization	according	to	which	all	three	examples	mentioned	qualify	as	crucial	experiments.		
4.	The	methods	of	this	project																																																									17	Note	that	Beauchemin’s	concept	of	theory-ladenness	is	wider	than	the	one	typically	used	in	the	philosophical	literature,	where	theory-ladenness	represents	a	problem	for	empirical	science,	not	a	feature	that	can	be	exploited	by	clever	experimenters.		18	In	philosophical	discussions	about	quantum	mechanics,	spin	is	considered	as	the	quantum	mechanical	quantity	par	excellence	and	the	Stern-Gerlach	apparatus	as	its	paradigmatic	experiment.	Notice	that	while	Stern	wanted	to	test	quantum	theory,	Gerlach	himself	considered	the	experiment	as	part	of	a	broader	experimental	research	program.	
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	Against	the	backdrop	of	the	different	experimental	situations	in	2011	and	2012,	and	the	various	solutions	of	the	EWSB	(including	the	Higgs	mechanism)	proposed	by	theoretical	model	builders,	our	project	investigated	the	general	attitudes	and	preferences	of	the	LHC	physicists	by	quantitative	and	qualitative	empirical	methods.	In	questionnaires	and	interviews	LHC	physicists	were	asked	about	their	views	of	the	status	of	particle	physics,	their	anticipation	of	what	the	LHC	will	ultimately	find,	and	the	ways	experimentalists	and	theorist	interact.		
	Questionnaires	were	sent	via	e-mail	to	some	15000	physicists	related	to	particle	physics	in	August	2011	and	September	2012.	Each	contained	eight	groups	of	questions,	which	were	to	be	answered	by	either	assigning	a	subjective	probability	for	the	correctness	of	a	certain	statement	or	by	choosing	an	answer	among	various	options.	These	were	(i)	the	probability	to	find	the	SM	Higgs	particle	(respectively	confirm	a	minimal	SM	Higgs),	(ii)	the	possible	explanations	of	new	physics	found	at	LHC,	(iii)	the	preference	for	certain	BSM	models	independently	of	the	LHC	results,	(iv)	the	criteria	guiding	the	researcher’s	answers	to	this	question,	(v)	the	most	critical	flaws	to	the	SM,	(vi)	the	signatures	in	which	LHC	would	most	likely	find	new	physics,	(vii)	general	features	of	particle	physics	for	whose	understanding	LHC	will	be	most	important,	(viii)	the	interaction	between	experimentalists	and	theoreticians.			A	large	fraction	of	the	questions	within	the	above-mentioned	groups	were	identical	for	the	two	periods,	however,	from	experience	with	the	first	one,	modifications	were	made	for	the	second	questionnaire.	In	the	first	questionnaire	some	answers	could	be	ranked	up	to	four	times.	This	was	considered	less	meaningful	for	the	second	questionnaire	and	modified.	In	2012,	a	question	was	also	added	to	address	the	Higgs	boson	candidate.	The	precise	list	of	the	questions	can	be	found	in	appendix	2.		The	lists	of	physicists	to	which	the	questionnaires	were	sent	both	in	2011	and	2012	were	obtained	from	the	INSPIRE	data	base	(Dallmeier-Tiessen,	S.,	Hecker,	B.,	Holtkamp,	A;	2016)	maintained	centrally	at	CERN.	This	data	base	is	established	by	surveying	journals,	conferences,	books,	theses	etc.	in	the	pertinent	fields	and	listing	all	authors.	For	the	purpose	of	the	questionnaire,	authors	in	the	categories	‘hep-ph’	(phenomenology),	‘hep-th’	(theory),	‘hep-ex’	(experiment)	were	contacted.	In	total	this	amounted	to	some	15000	authors.	About	half	of	the	authors	are	theorists	belonging	to	about	the	same	amount	to	either	the	‘th’	or	‘ph’	category,	the	other	half	experimentalists.	Taking	into	account	that	some	8000	experimental	physicists	are	directly	involved	in	the	LHC	experiments,	with	an	additional	number	of	several	thousand	theorists,	the	list	of	physicists	included	probably	almost	all	those	who	are	actively	working	on	LHC	physics.	Certainly,	some	physicists	on	the	list	were	somewhat	remote	from	LHC	experiments	or	theory,	e.g.	mathematical	theorists	or	accelerator	physicists,	but	also	some	retired	physicists	or	those	who	had	left	the	field.	It	is	difficult	to	assess,	how	large	a	fraction	this	was.			The	anonymous	replies	were	collected	and	statistically	evaluated	at	Wuppertal.	There	were	1435,	respectively	903	replies	to	the	two	questionnaires,	which	corresponds	to	a	return	rate	of	10%,	respectively	6%	which	is	acceptable	for	empirical	studies	that	are	combined	with	interviews.	Our	goal	had	not	been	to	obtain	a	truly	representative	sample	in	the	sense	of	quantitative	sociology.	Still,	there	seems	to	be	no	strong	bias	in	our	replies:	the	regional	distribution	of	respondents	is	consistent	with	the	regional	distribution	of	physicists	working	in	LHC	experiments,	and	also	the	fraction	of	theorists	and	experimentalists	agrees	with	the	fraction	in	the	list.	Yet,	there	are	discrepancies	as	regards	seniority:	only	few	PhD	students	(<5%	of	the	replies)	have	answered	the	questionnaires,	whereas	they	amount	to	about	a	third	in	the	LHC	experiments.	In	the	
14		
following,	the	replies	were	considered	separately	for	experimentalists	and	theorists	because	this	promised	some	interesting	insights.	In	addition,	the	comparison	of	the	replies	before	and	after	the	discovery	should	indicate	certain	trends	in	the	thinking	of	the	LHC	physicists.			In	addition	to	the	questionnaires,	9	(6)	LHC	physicists	were	interviewed	around	April	2011	(September	2012).	Both	groups	included	experimentalists	from	different	LHC	experiments	and	theorists.	Furthermore,	it	was	attempted	to	cover	a	wide	range	of	interests	and	responsibilities	within	the	LHC	project.	There	is	only	a	small	overlap	between	the	physicists	in	the	two	rounds;	this	was	done	deliberately	in	order	to	obtain	a	broader	picture.	The	physicists	interviewed	and	their	respective	roles	at	the	time	of	the	interviews	are	listed	in	Appendix	2.	In	the	following	discussion,	no	names	will	be	assigned	to	the	respective	citations.				Each	interview	took	about	an	hour.	A	few	topics	were	addressed	in	every	interview,	for	instance:	in	2011,	the	prospects	of	a	Higgs	discovery,	the	perceived	status	of	super-symmetry,	and	the	chances	to	find	new	physics;	in	2012,	the	impact	of	the	Higgs	discovery	on	the	interviewee’s	research.	On	the	other	hand,	the	interviews	were	kept	flexible	to	better	understand	the	reasoning	and	preferences	of	each	interviewee.	This	included,	depending	on	the	answers	of	the	counterpart,	also	questions	about	the	work	environment,	the	methods	of	research,	which	outcome	is	expected	at	the	LHC	and	why,	and	which	outcome	would	be	preferred	on	theoretical	or	pragmatic-aesthetic	grounds.			
	
5.	The	physicists’	expectations	in	autumn	2011	
	At	the	beginning	of	our	empirical	study,	the	physical	situation	was	characterized	by	an	excellent	performance	of	the	LHC	and	its	experiments.	The	year	2011	brought	an	unexpectedly	large	amount	of	data	at	the	energy	of	7	TeV.	Based	on	this	understanding,	the	LHC	physicists	performed	simulation	studies	predicting	that	the	whole	range	pertinent	to	the	mass	of	a	Higgs	boson	could	be	covered	at	the	LHC	within	two	years.	On	the	other	hand,	although	a	broad	range	of	searches	for	new	effects	had	been	performed	by	fall	2011,	no	sign	for	any	of	the	many	postulated	extensions	of	the	SM	had	been	found.	In	particular,	no	indication	for	Supersymmetry	was	observed.	Supersymmetry	had	been	highly	favoured	by	theorists,	and	it	was	predicted	that	its	particles	could	be	detected	shortly	after	the	LHC	launch.	Supersymmetry	is	the	only	BSM	model	that	provides	a	strict	constraint	on	the	highest	allowed	mass	of	the	Higgs	boson	(of	about	130	GeV).	The	sensitivity	of	many	of	these	searches	for	new	physics	reached	the	energy	scale	of	about	1	TeV,	at	which	the	naturalness	problem	should	have	been	resolved	before	the	corrections	become	too	high.	
	
5.1	Outcome	of	questionnaires		In	total	1435	physicists	answered	the	questions,	with	the	number	of	theorists	(769)	and	experimentalists	(696)	being	about	the	same.	The	number	of	replies	to	each	of	the	questions	differed	only	by	a	small	amount.	Assuming	multinomial	distributions	and	an	outcome	for	an	answer	of	50%,	these	numbers	imply	a	typical	error	margin	on	the	answers	of	1.5%	for	the	total	sample	and	2%	for	each	subgroup.	The	precise	uncertainty	depends	on	the	number	of	answers	given;	the	fewer	there	are,	the	larger	is	the	relative	uncertainty.	Where	relevant,	the	exact	uncertainties	will	be	provided.				
5.1.1	The	importance	of	the	origin	of	mass	
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The	high	expectations	that	physicists	had	in	the	LHC	to	understand	the	mechanism	of	mass	generation	become	most	apparent	in	the	replies	to	a	question	about	the	importance	of	LHC	results	for	several	key	problems	of	current	physics.	Participants	were	asked	whether	they	fully	agreed,	somewhat	agreed,	were	undecided,	somewhat	disagreed,	or	fully	disagreed	with	the	statement:	‘LHC	results	will	be	very	important	to	
understand	…’.	Close	to	50%	(48%/49%	of	the	theorists/experimentalists)	chose	to	‘fully	agree’,	and	close	to	80%	(77%/80%)	at	least	‘somewhat	agreed’	on	the	importance	of	the	LHC	for	the	‘origin	of	mass’.	Comparable	results	were	obtained	for	two	other	topics	from	the	SM,	‘strong	interactions‘	and	‘flavour	physics’,	while	the	outcomes	for	BSM	physics	were	much	lower.	The	as	of	then	only	undiscovered	element	of	the	SM	was	accordingly	given	the	highest	priority	among	all	the	potential	features	that	could	be	found	at	the	LHC.						
5.1.2	Expectation	on	finding	the	Higgs	Boson	at	LHC		
	
	
Fig.1	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	assigning	probabilities	in	
intervals	of	20%	on	the	chance	that	the	LHC	will	find	a	Standard	Model	Higgs	Boson	(Questionnaire	
of	2011)	
	
	Given	the	importance	of	the	origin	of	mass	and	the	fact	that	the	LHC	was	expected	to	provide	the	ultimate	sensitivity	for	finding	the	SM	Higgs	boson	the	questionnaire	asked	physicists:	‚What	is	your	personal	estimate	of	the	probability	[that]	the	LHC	will	find	the	
Standard	Model	Higgs	boson?’.	This	(subjective)	probability	was	to	be	given	in	terms	of	percentage	intervals	of	20%,	which	represented	the	respondent’s	current	degree	of	belief.	The	replies	did	not	reveal	any	strong	tendency	towards	either	discovery	or	non-discovery,	but	instead	were	rather	uniformly	distributed	over	all	probability	values	(see	Fig.	1).	Some	35%	(34%	of	theorists/35%	of	experimentalists)	assigned	a	chance	of	at	most	40%	that	the	SM	Higgs	boson	will	be	discovered,	whereas	only	a	few	more	(41%/36%)	expected	it	to	be	found	with	60%	probability	or	more;	the	values	for	more	than	80%	probability	were	even	lower	(22%/15%).	Thus,	although	simulation	results	showed	that	the	LHC,	in	virtue	of	its	foreseeable	performance,	had	the	potential	to	find	the	SM	Higgs	boson	if	it	at	all	existed,	a	large	fraction	of	LHC	physicists	assumed	that	it	would	not	be	found.	These	assessments	were	largely	identical	for	experimentalists	and	theorists.			
19	
15	
21	
19	
22	
4	
18	 17	
23	
21	
15	
6	0-20%	 21-40%	 41-60%	 61-80	 81-100%	 DON'T	KNOW	
The	LHC	will	find	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	boson	
Theo.	 Exp.	
16		
A	second	question	addressed	the	‘personal	estimate	of	the	probability	...	that	the	LHC	will	
rule	out	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	boson’.	In	this	case	59%/46%	of	the	theorists/experimentalists	considered	the	probability	low	(i.e.	smaller	than	40%).	On	the	other	hand,	only	19%/26%	(uncertainty	about	2.5%)	estimated	that	the	SM	Higgs	boson	could	be	ruled	out	with	high	probability	(i.e.	larger	than	60%).	Low	probability	here	means	either	that	the	SM	Higgs	boson	will	eventually	be	found	or	that	a	candidate	is	found	whose	properties	cannot	be	measured	precisely	enough	to	rule	out	other	interpretations.	High	probability	instead	means	that	the	LHC	will	be	able	to	definitively	rule	out	the	SM	Higgs	particle	because	there	is	no	such	particle	or	it	will	find	one	or	more	candidates	that	accomplish	mass	generation	with	properties	different	from	the	SM	expectations.	The	responses	showed	that,	in	2011,	theorists	were	more	sceptical	about	the	LHC	to	rule	out	the	SM	Higgs	boson	than	experimentalists.					
		
Fig.2	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	assigning	probabilities	in	
intervals	of	20%	on	the	chance	that	the	LHC	will	rule	out	a	Standard	Model	Higgs	Boson	
(Questionnaire	of	2011)			Although	the	two	last	questions	are	closely	connected,	there	are	subtle	differences	that	lead	to	somewhat	different	replies.	Firstly,	the	fraction	of	physicists	that	assigned	an	at	least	60%	probability	to	find	the	SM	Higgs	boson	is	smaller	than	the	fraction	of	physicists	who	assigned	an	at	least	60%	chance	that	it	will	not	be	ruled	out.	Secondly,	whereas	the	answers	of	theorists	and	experimentalists	were	rather	consistent	with	the	first	question,	a	significantly	larger	portion	of	theorists	than	experimentalists	considered	it	unlikely	that	the	SM	boson	will	be	ruled	out.			The	first	difference	is	probably	related	to	the	much	stricter	requirement	to	confirm	not	only	the	existence	of	a	new	particle,	but	to	determine	all	of	its	properties	to	a	precision	that	allows	one,	e.g.,	to	distinguish	it	from	alternative	models	of	EWSB.	Especially	in	the	case	of	a	more	complicated	Higgs	group	structure	(as	favoured	by	many	physicists	–	see	below)	it	will	be	more	difficult	to	unambiguously	identify	the	particle	to	be	a	SM	Higgs	boson	than	to	rule	it	out.	How	to	interpret	the	differences	between	experimentalists	and	theorists	is	more	difficult.	In	general,	the	replies	–	and	the	interviews	below	–	indicate	a	greater	reluctance	of	experimentalists	to	commit	themselves	to	what	their	data	will	finally	reveal.		
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	This	exemplifies	the	first	lesson	from	the	2011	questionnaire.	In	contrast	to	public	perception,	interpreting	the	newly	found	particle	as	being	the	SM	Higgs	boson	was	not	a	simple	yes/no	alternative	to	be	decided	promptly.	Physicists	were	largely	prepared	for	a	more	complicated	outcome	that	achieved	all	that	the	SM	Higgs	mechanism	was	designed	for.	Thus,	finding	a	particle	consistent	with	a	SM	Higgs	would	only	be	the	first	step	in	further	investigating	the	properties	of	the	new	particle.	The	second	conclusion	from	these	two	questions	is	that	there	existed	a	substantial	scepticism	among	physicists	as	to	the	existence	of	a	SM	Higgs	at	this	stage.	This	means	that,	although	the	LHC	was	expected	to	cover	the	whole	allowed	mass	range	for	the	SM	Higgs	particle,	the	LHC	community	was	rather	undecided	if	it	exists.	Taking	both	lessons	together	shows	that	there	was	no	significant	asymmetry	in	physicists’	expectations	between	refuting	and	confirming	the	SM.				
5.1.3	Expectations	on	various	EWSB	models			The	questionnaire	also	addressed	potential	scenarios	for	‘new	physics’,	i.e.	a	process	or	particle	that	is	not	part	of	the	SM.	Physicists	were	asked	‘Assuming	that	the	LHC	finds	
new	physics,	which	(if	any)	of	the	following	models	do	you	think	has	the	best	chance	of	
explaining	it’.	The	physicists	had	two	ranked	choices;	here	we	will	typically	just	provide	the	first	choice,	the	second	gives	fairly	similar	results.	Several	models,	including	those	rather	remote	from	EWSB,	like	string	theory,	extra	spatial	dimensions,	or	4th	generation	models,	were	also	considered.	(cf.	Appendix	2)	In	the	following,	we	focus	on	the	three	most	popular	groups	that	were	also	those	most	closely	related	to	EWSB.	(Fig.3)	
		
		
Fig.3	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	most	probable	
model	that	the	LHC	might	find.	Only	answers	with	relation	to	the	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	
are	given,	the	remaining	51/58%	refer	to	different	models	(Questionnaire	of	2011)			Fractions	of	10/11%	of	theorists/experimentalists	opted	for	an	extended	Higgs	sector,	i.e.,	more	than	one	Higgs	boson.	About	twice	as	many	(23%/24%)	voted	for	the	favourite	theory	of	Supersymmetry,	which	also	requires	an	extended	Higgs	sector.	Therefore,	about	one	third	of	physicists	were	expecting	new	physics	in	extended	Higgs	sectors	either	without	or	within	the	context	of	an	explicit	model.	Both	of	these	answers	assume	Higgs	bosons	and	expect	them	to	be	elementary	as	the	SM	Higgs.	As	mentioned	
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above,	one	of	the	Higgs	bosons	in	the	extended	sector	might	have	properties	very	similar	to	the	SM	Higgs.				In	addition,	a	sizeable	fraction	of	theorists	(16±1.3%)	expected	a	dynamically	generated	electroweak	symmetry	breaking,	leading	to	a	composite	scalar	particle	with	several	properties	that	are	distinctively	different	from	the	SM	Higgs	boson.	As	discussed	in	Sect.	2.3.,	at	least	the	historically	first	such	model,	Technicolour	–	a	model	that	also	contained	the	least	additional	assumptions	–,	had	been	strongly	disfavoured	by	data.	This	might	be	the	reason	why	only	7(±1)%	of	the	experimentalists	chose	this	option.			The	follow-up	question	(Fig.	4)	was	‘which	preference’	[physicists]	have	‘independently	of	
the	expectations	regarding	LHC	results’,	i.e.,	irrespective	of	the	sensitivity	of	LHC	itself.	Whereas	the	replies	alluding	to	an	extended	sector	remained	rather	the	same	as	to	the	previous	question,	dynamical	EWSB	was	now	even	more	favoured	by	theorists	(19%),	while	the	fraction	of	experimentalists	preferring	this	alternative	was	unchanged	at	7%.19			
		
Fig.4	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	preferred	model	
for	physics	beyond	the	Standard	Model.	Only	answers	with	relation	to	the	electroweak	symmetry	
breaking	are	given,	the	remaining	50/58%	refer	to	different	models	(Questionnaire	of	2011).	
	The	difference	between	the	answers	as	to	the	importance	of	dynamical	EWSB	as	a	vision	for	the	LHC	data,	on	the	one	hand,	and	in	a	general	perspective,	on	the	other,	shows	that	physicists’	preferences	are	also	guided	by	nonfactual	and	non-epistemic	aspects.	The	perceived	‘beauty’	of	a	theoretical	framework,	or	other	pragmatic	values	of	theory	preference,	weigh	significantly	relative	to	the	chances	of	confirmation	or	disconfirmation	by	soon-to-be-available	experimental	data.					
5.1.4	The	importance	of	the	naturalness	criterion		The	question	as	to	the	preferred	model	was	followed	by	the	question	‘which	(if	any)	of	
the	following	criteria	have	guided	you	in	answering	the	previous	question?’.	Four	ranked																																																									19	Although	the	present	paper	focuses	on	EWSB,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	largest	percentages	for	new	physics	are	obtained	for	the	option	‘None	of	those,	but	something	totally	unexpected’	(28%	for	both	theoreticians	and	experimentalists).	The	perspectives	for	new	physics	will	be	discussed	in	a	separate	paper	that	will	also	analyse	some	of	the	models	neglected	here.	
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choices	were	allowed	(Fig.	5).	Considering	only	the	first	choice,	the	criterion	that	a	model	‘solves	the	naturalness	problem’	was	preferred	by	21%/17%.	It	is	thus	considered	as	important	as	the	classical	pragmatic,	or	rather	aesthetic,	criteria	of	‘elegance’	(22%/18%)	and	‘simplicity’	(16%/20%)20.	More	‘factual’	criteria	like	the	model	‘will	provide	a	better	fit	to	the	data’,	or	‘makes	specific	predictions’	or	even	‘has	a	candidate	for	dark	matter’	are	much	less	considered	(each	one	below	10%	for	both	experimentalists	and	theorists).					
		
Fig.5	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	criteria	to	choose	
the	preferred	model.	(Questionnaire	of	2011).		Physicists	were	further	asked	‘what	(if	any)	are	the	most	critical	flaws	of	the	Standard	
Model’,	and	could	make	up	to	three	unranked	choices	(Fig.	6).	Indeed	the	problem	of	‘quadratic	divergences	in	corrections	to	the	Higgs	mass’,	causing	the	naturalness	problem,	was	mentioned	often	by	theorists	(14%),	while	only	by	10%	of	the	experimentalists	(statistical	uncertainty	of	difference	2.2%).	However,	quadratic	divergences	are	considered	less	of	a	flaw	of	the	SM	than	its	many	parameters	(18%/19%),	the	absence	of	gravity	within	the	Standard	Model	framework	(18%/21%),	or	that	it	does	not	include	a	Dark	Matter	candidate	(17%/17%).		
																																																								20	It	should	be	noted	that	physicists	were	not	given	any	specific	definition	of	these	concepts;	hence	the	replies	were	based	on	the	intuition	of	the	individual	physicist.	We	do	not	consider	this	as	too	problematic	for	our	purpose,	not	least	because	many	philosophical	authors	who	provide	a	definition	-	cf.	Baker	2013	discussed	in	Section	3.2	–	simultaneously	emphasize	that	the	terminology	often	is	all	over	the	place.	
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Fig.6	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	most	critical	flaw	of	
the	Standard	Model	(Questionnaire	of	2011).	The	three	answers	were	summed	up	and	normalized.		Both	of	these	questions	refer	to	SM	properties	that	point	beyond	its	limits.	But	they	do	so	from	a	somewhat	different	perspective.	The	first	(Fig.	5)	had	asked	for	the	motivations	of	model	preferences	in	Fig.	4,	that	is	irrespective	of	the	chances	to	soon	find	solutions	at	LHC.	The	second	(Fig.	6)	asked	for	flaws	of	the	SM,	irrespective	of	the	existence	of	a	credible	model	or	strategy	to	resolve	them.	In	both	questions	naturalness,	respectively	quadratic	divergences,	scored	within	the	top	group	of	the	list	and	matched	their	counterparts,	the	pragmatic	values	of	preference	simplicity	and	elegance,	and	respectively	(among	the	flaws),	the	many	parameters	of	the	SM.21		However,	the	differences	in	the	relative	weights	for	other	elements	pointing	BSM,	e.g.	for	Dark	Matter,	are	significant.	To	our	mind,	this	has	to	do	with	the	different	perspectives	of	the	questions.	There	are	several	proposals	of	physics	BSM,	however	no	universally	agreed	upon	Dark	Matter	candidate.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	significant	flaw	of	the	SM,	even	though	it	may	be	only	solved	in	the	longer	term.	Naturalness,	instead,	is	of	immediate	relevance	to	problems	of	model	builders	and	guides	expectations	for	BSM	at	the	LHC.	Experimentalists	and	theorists	largely	agree	in	this	attitude.			
5.2	Responses	in	interviews	
	The	questionnaires	were	complemented	by	interviews	with	nine	theorists	and	experimentalists22.	Overall,	their	statements	were	consistent	with	the	outcomes	of	the	questionnaire.	Yet	they	provide	a	deeper	insight	into	the	reasoning	of	elementary	particle	physicists	at	the	time.	In	particular,	they	illustrate	the	rather	diverse	set	of	attitudes	and	the	broad	variety	of	expectations	among	the	physicists.	The	following	selected	quotes	are	related	to	the	mechanism	of	EWSB.																																																												21	The	“many	parameters”	of	the	SM	(Fig.	6)	are	traditionally	seen	as	a	principal	lack	of	simplicity	and	motivate	physicists	to	devise	other	models.	In	the	same	vein,	the	“quadratic	corrections	to	the	Higgs	mass”	(Fig.	6)	amount	to	a	peculiar	technical	feature	in	the	renormalization	scheme	for	the	scalar	Higgs	boson	that	motivates	models	“solving	the	naturalness	problem”	(Fig.	5).	In	Section	5.2.3.	we	will	provide	some	evidence	from	interviews	that	notwithstanding	the	philosophical	distinctions	discussed	in	Section	3.1.,	naturalness	is	largely	treated	in	the	same	fashion	throughout	the	community	of	particle	physicists.	22	For	the	list	of	names,	see	the	table	in	Appendix	1.	
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5.2.1	Crucial,	Long-Awaited,	but	Uncertain:	Does	the	Higgs	boson	exist?		The	interviews	were	conducted	at	a	time,	when	the	allowed	mass	range	for	the	SM	Higgs	boson	was	rapidly	shrinking	and	the	experiments	were	close	to	completely	covering	the	remaining	parameter	space.	No	wonder	that	in	all	interviews	the	suspense	whether	the	Higgs	boson	would	be	discovered	or	some	alternative	mechanism	of	EWSB	would	become	visible,	played	a	pivotal	role.	Here	are	two	typical	examples.	One	physicist	stated	that	a	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	would	amount	‘to	a	revolution	...	We	
understand	the	mass,	we	understand	a	lot	of	things’.	Another	one	assessed	the	‘Higgs	
problem’	as	a	‘key	question’.	The	measurement	of	its	mass	should	‚be	a	very	important	
clue	to	what	sort	of	theory	maybe	goes	beyond	it’.			Although	accordingly	an	experimental	verdict,	a	crucial	and	long-awaited	test	for	the	SM,	was	in	sight,	opinions	diverged	on	what	its	outcome	would	ultimately	be.	In	this	respect,	the	answers	span	a	broad	range.	At	one	end	of	the	spectrum,	an	experimentalist	argued	that	in	this	situation	one	should	‘press	theorists’	to	answer	the	question:	‘if	there	
is	no	such	thing	[the	Higgs	boson],	then	what?’.	Being	a	few	femtobarns	away	from	the	final	call	about	the	Higgs	boson,	this	represented	the	mood	of	some	physicists	that	one	had	to	move	to	a	‘provocative	question’.	The	interviewee	even	identified	a	‚change	of	
mind-set’	because	the	-	to	date	unsuccessful	–	experimental	searches	led	to	a	general	doubt	whether	the	Higgs	was	a	‚done	deal’’.			Other	interviewees	emphasized	the	personal	and	even	emotional	aspects	of	this	increasingly	pressing	insecurity.	E.g.	‘I	don’t	know,	I	don’t	know’:	‘we	have	been	waiting	so	
long	for	this,	….	there	is	…	no	concrete	criterion	to	really	judge	whether	[it]	is	more	or	less	
likely	and	emotionally,	needless	to	say,	I	would	like	to	see	that	as	soon	as	possible,	so	I	hope	
it’s	more	likely	that	it	comes	out,	but	it	is	purely	emotional	because	I	do	not	want	to	wait	
another	five	years,	but	I	have	no	idea.’	Another	interviewee	diagnosed	a	change	of	attitude.	Previously	colleagues	might	have	argued	that	it	‘is	much	more	exciting	to	see	
nothing.	But	it	was	before	LHC	started.	Now	that	things	work	so	well,	people	are	sure	that	
the	Higgs	will	be	found	in	2012,	2013,	public	opinion	you	know	changed	dramatically’.	It	is	‘psychologically	very	interesting’.	This	strong	desire	to	‘find	something’	also	reflected	the	increasing	gap	between	the	enormous	success	of	the	SM	predictions	during	the	past	40	years	and	the	fact	that	quite	a	few	still	unsolved	questions	remained. 	Other	experimental	interviewees	were	rather	optimistic	to	find	the	Higgs	boson.	One	stated	‘I	would	be	more	surprised	if	they	don’t	find	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	because	I	
think	that	the	Standard	Model	with	the	Higgs	mechanism	at	the	moment	is	one	of	the	best	
ways	of	explaining	the	masses	of	the	gauge	bosons	and	particle	masses,	so	I	would	really	
like	the	Standard	Model	like	Higgs’,	or	more	pronounced	‘I	will	be	surprised	if	it	is	not	
found.	I	think	it	will	be	found	at	120	GeV.’	(This	was	in	accordance	with	the	indirect	and	direct	limits	at	that	time.)			The	attitude,	according	to	which	the	Higgs	is	‘the	best	way’	to	explain	masses	had	already	been	strengthened	by	indirect	measurements	disfavouring	otherwise	preferred	alternative	models.	It	also	becomes	apparent	in	replies	from	a	theorist,	who	held	that	‘there	is	a	lot	of	circumstantial	evidence	in	favour	of	that	[i.e.	the	Higgs	boson],	the	case	is	
not	proved	but	that	might	well	happen’.	This	factual	statement,	however,	is	immediately	put	into	perspective,	when	the	same	interviewee	points	to	his	preference	‘I	would	find	a	
lot	of	intellectual	attraction	in	the	dynamical	symmetry	breaking	models’.		
5.2.2	Is	the	Higgs	mechanism	attractive?		While	the	expectation	as	to	the	possible	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	was	an	issue	of	
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considerable	suspense	at	that	time,	the	motivations	to	expect	or	reject	the	Higgs	mechanism,	differ	among	the	physicists.	Already	in	the	above	statements,	it	became	apparent	that	the	mechanism,	even	if	expected,	was	regarded	with	some	reservations.			There	were	several	values	of	theory	preference	in	play.	One	theorist	held	that	the	Higgs	mechanism	is	also	disfavoured	‚because	of	its	minimal	predictive	power’.	Instead	the	alternative	scenario	of	strong	EWSB	is	intellectually	favoured.	‘Whereas	the	dream	would	
be,	in	a	dynamical	theory	of	electroweak-symmetry	breaking	…,	there	is	at	least	a	
conceivable	possibility	of	making	definite	predictions,	however	they	should	turn	out.’	This	requires	a	‘somewhat	bigger	theory’.	The	scepticism	is	also	shared	by	experimentalists.	One	stated	drastically,	‘the	Higgs	is	a	totally	ad	hoc	thing.	.....	If	the	Higgs	is	not	there,	it	
will	not	surprise	me.’	He	argued	that	‘people	had	faith	in	it	the	way	people	have	faith	in	
God’.	Another	experimentalist	held,	that	even	if	the	‘Higgs	will	be	found,	...	the	Higgs	
mechanism	seems	not	elegant’	and	there	are	‘very	attractive	theories	without	the	Higgs’.			In	fact,	only	a	few	physicists	interviewed	emphasized	the	broader	virtues	of	the	Higgs	boson	beyond	merely	giving	a	solution	for	one	specific	problem.	One	theorist	focussed	on	its	role	in	the	more	encompassing	theory	of	Supersymmetry,	which	as	mentioned	gives	an	upper	bound	of	the	Higgs	mass.	It	would	be	‘very	disappointing	to	find	Higgs	at	a	
mass	compatible	with	SM	at	high	energies	[above	130	GeV]’.	‘If	the	Higgs	boson	is	light	as	
suggested	by	the	data	[i.e.	indirect	measurements	and	left–over	phase	space	masses],	then	
presumably	…..	super-symmetry	is	a	prototype	of	such	a	weakly	interacting	extension	of	the	
standard	Higgs	mode’,	i.e.	the	virtue	of	the	Higgs	mechanism	is	its	accordance	with	a	larger	and	generally	favoured	theory.	On	the	other	hand,	the	interviewee	points	out,	that	the	favoured	variant	of	supersymmetry,	has	been	so	tightly	tested	without	finding	anything.	Therefore,	one	finds	oneself	in	‘a	weird	situation	‘.		Moreover,	one	theorist	rejected	the	statement	that	the	Higgs	mechanism	is	complicated	and	ad	hoc,	but	emphasised	the	virtue	of	introducing	spontaneous	symmetry	breaking	into	particle	physics	in	general.	The	Higgs	discovery	would	then	be	seen	as	something	new	‘in	the	sense	of	new	particles,	….	but	it	is	a	break–through	since	you	have	the	
experimental	test	of	spontaneous	symmetry	breaking’.	Moreover,	this	general	idea	would	be	‘not	immediately	thrown	away’,	if	the	Higgs	boson	would	not	be	found.			
5.2.3	The	problem	of	naturalness	
	Several	interviews	stressed	the	value	of	naturalness	as	a	pragmatic	guideline.	Yet	as	regards	its	aesthetic	aspects,	opinions	differed.	One	theorists	became	a	proponent	of	Supersymmetry	once	it	was	shown	to	solve	the	naturalness	problem;	‘so	for	me	the	big,	
sort	of	change	in	my	world	view	came	when	people	pointed	out	that	super-symmetrical	
particles	could	potentially	control	the	quantum	corrections	and	make	the	theory	more	
manageable.’.	Another	theorist,	who	was	asked	whether	the	naturalness	or	the	hierarchy	problem	were	serious,	answered	more	cautiously:	‘now	to	assess	this,	one	goes	back	to	
these	convictions	somehow	that	the	progress	of	science	is	always	driven	by	an	aesthetic	
judgement	….	that	goes	beyond	mechanical	relations	between	formulas,	equations	and	the	
need	to	see	beyond.	In	other	words,	when	you	see	some	recurrence,	when	you	see	some	
“accident”,	it	is	natural	for	a	scientist	to	consider	the	possibility	that	it	is	not	an	accident	
but	there	is	something	beyond	and	then	this	accident	becomes	natural.	Now,	this	is	not	
always	correct,	there	are	many	accidents	that	we	witness	around	that	are	not	driven	by	the	
first	principles	but	just	accidents.	So	in	that	respect	one	can	be	wrong,	but	for	the	issue	of	
naturalness,	all	of	it,	so	called	problems	of	the	standard	model,	the	picture	is	quite	
compelling.’	Only	one	experimentalist	was	explicitly	asked	about	naturalness.	Again,	there	was	no	strong	commitment,	but	instead	it	was	‘take[n]	easy,	it	is	a	matter	of	taste’.	Note	that	the	interviewees	did	not	distinguish	between	naturalness,	fine	tuning	of	the	
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quantum	corrections,	and	quadratic	divergences.			
6.	The	physicists’	response	to	the	discovery	of	a	Higgs	candidate	
	A	year	after	the	first	questionnaire	was	sent	out	and	the	interviews	had	been	performed,	a	sufficient	amount	of	data	was	collected	by	the	LHC	experiments	to	provide	the	desired	sensitivity	for	a	SM	Higgs	boson	in	almost	the	whole	remaining	mass	range.	Indeed,	in	July	2012,	the	observation	of	a	new	boson	was	announced.	Since	the	signatures	were	consistent	with	the	expectations,	there	was	a	very	broad	consensus	that	this	particle	was	a	very	strong	candidate	for	a	SM	Higgs.	However,	the	properties	known	by	then	were	few,	and	the	precision	of	the	measurements	was	still	marginal23.		The	simultaneous	searches	for	new	effects	BSM	remained	inconclusive,	although	the	mass	reach	and	sensitivity	was	extended.		Shortly	after	the	announcement,	a	new	questionnaire	was	sent	to	the	same	mailing	list	and	a	new	round	of	interviews	was	performed.	One	of	the	main	aims	was	to	understand	if,	respectively	how,	the	views	and	expectations	of	physicists	had	changed.			
6.1	Outcome	of	the	Questionnaire	in	2012	
	The	second	questionnaire	was	sent	out	in	September	2012.	To	a	large	part,	the	questions	were	identical	to	those	of	the	first	questionnaire.	In	this	survey	903	physicists	replied,	among	them	464	theorists	and	439	experimentalists.	The	typical	statistical	uncertainty	in	the	replies	is	therefore	1.7%	for	the	whole	sample	and	2.4%	for	each	of	the	subsamples.	The	relative	uncertainty	of	the	answers	between	the	two	questionnaires	depends	on	whether	the	same	or	different	physicists	replied.	In	the	former	case	the	relative	uncertainty	would	be	very	small,	in	the	latter	case	some	2.3%	(for	the	whole	sample).	Since	the	answers	were	given	anonymously,	there	was	no	way	to	tell.	Compared	to	the	first	round	the	possibility	of	ranked	answers	was	restricted	to	a	single	choice	only	or	to	unranked	options.	The	subjective	degrees	of	belief	in	a	statement	(cf.	4.1.1.)	were	rephrased	as	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	etc.					
6.1.1	What	is	the	new	particle?		Reacting	to	the	discovery	of	the	new	particle,	a	set	of	questions	was	directed	at	its	likely	significance	for	the	SM	and	beyond.	The	first	statement	to	be	evaluated	was	‚After	the	
discovery	of	the	new	particle	at	125	GeV,	the	LHC	will	confirm	the	minimal	Higgs	sector’.		The	majority	of	both	experimentalists	and	theorists	(63%/63%)	fully	or	somewhat	agreed	with	this	statement	(see	Fig.	7).		Compared	to	the	first	questionnaire24,	this	is,	not	surprisingly,	a	significant	increase	from	the	41%/36%.	Still,	only	19%/23%	‘fully	agreed’	that	LHC	will	confirm	the	minimal	Higgs	sector	of	the	SM.		
																																																								23	It	was	only	half	a	year	later,	after	more	data	became	available	and	more	studies	had	been	made	that	the	particle	lost	its	status	of	being	a	candidate	and	was	indeed	considered	a	Higgs	boson.	This	became	apparent	in	a	CERN	press	release	(CERN	press	office,	2013)	in	which	recent	results	were	summarized.			24	As	a	reminder,	the	exact	wording	of	the	first	questionnaire	was	‘What	is	your	personal	estimate	
...	that	the	LHC	will	find	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	boson’.	
24		
		
Fig.7	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	assigning	probabilities	in	
intervals	of	20%	on	the	chance	that	the	LHC	will	confirm	a	minimal	Model	Higgs	Boson	
(Questionnaire	of	2012)			This	question	combined	two	aspects:	whether	the	observed	particle	was	indeed	a	Higgs	boson	and	whether	it	would	remain	the	only	Higgs	boson,	i.e.	the	SM	Higgs	boson.	This	ambiguity	could	be	somewhat	resolved	by	asking	a	second	question,	to	wit,	whether	the	LHC	will	‘find	a	more	complicated	Higgs	sector’;	for	the	new	particle	could	be	one	of	many	Higgs	bosons	(Fig.	8).	A	sizeable	fraction	of	30%/31%	(theorist/experimentalists)	expected	this	to	be	the	case.	This	is	almost	the	remainder	of	those	who	fully	or	somewhat	agreed	with	the	first	statement.	However,	almost	half	(46%/47%)	of	the	responses	were	‘undecided’,	consistent	for	theorists	and	experimentalists.	As	in	2011	a	more	complicated	Higgs	sector	appeared	to	be	a	very	attractive	option	for	many	physicists.	One	may	speculate	about	the	reason	for	this	rather	neutral	opinion.	Certainly,	the	data	were	too	scarce	at	the	time	of	the	questionnaire;	moreover,	the	physicists	may	have	been	considering	the	probably	limited	precision	of	the	LHC	measurements.			
		
Fig.8	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	assigning	probabilities	in	
intervals	of	20%	on	the	chance	that	the	LHC	will	find	a	more	complicated	Higgs	sector	
(Questionnaire	of	2012)		
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The	third	question	asked	if	the	LHC	will	‘find	an	alternative	mechanism	of	EWSB’	(Fig.	9).	It	was	only	a	minority	of	roughly	10%	that	agreed	at	least	‘somewhat’	with	this	statement.	Full	agreement	was	at	the	1%	level.	Given	the	discovery	of	a	Higgs	candidate	shortly	before	the	questionnaire,	such	a	result	is	not	surprising.	Even	though	the	LHC	data	available	at	that	stage	were	still	marginal,	the	consistency	with	what	is	expected	for	a	SM	Higgs	boson	disfavoured	a	radically	different	mechanism	already	then.	Although	a	third	of	the	replies	were	undecided,	the	vast	majority	of	physicists	no	longer	expected	any	radically	new	physics	to	emerge	in	the	sector	of	mass	generation.			
		
Fig.9	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	assigning	probabilities	in	
intervals	of	20%	on	the	chance	that	the	LHC	will	find	an	alternative	mechanism	of	EWSB	
(Questionnaire	of	2012)		
	
6.1.2	Which	alternatives	to	the	SM	Higgs	are	still	considered?		Whereas	the	new	particle	was	largely	considered	to	be	a	Higgs	boson,	its	discovery	initially	did	not	preclude	it	to	be,	or	involve,	an	element	of	new	physics.	Hence	physicists	were	again	asked:	’Assuming	that	the	LHC	finds	new	physics,	which	(if	any)	of	the	
following	models	do	you	think	has	the	best	chance	of	explaining	it?’.	However,	while	in	2011	two	ranked	choices	were	possible,	only	one	was	allowed	in	2012	(Fig.	10).	To	compare	the	two	surveys,	only	the	first	choice	of	2011	is	considered	here.		Some	40%	favoured	extended	Higgs	sectors	either	with	or	without	Supersymmetry,	an	increase	from	the	about	34%	in	2011.	Going	into	more	detail,	the	fraction	of	those	who	assumed	Supersymmetry	to	explain	new	physics	did	not	change	with	the	discovery	(25%/24%	from	23%/24%	as	the	first	choice	in	2011).	Given	that	Supersymmetry	was	the	only	theory	to	predict	such	a	light	Higgs	boson	(cf.	Sect.	2),	its	discovery	could	be	seen	to	have	strengthened	the	case	for	supersymmetry.	On	the	other	hand,	none	of	the	expected	direct	signals	of	Supersymmetry	had	been	found,	seemingly	balancing	the	indirect	support	from	the	Higgs	mass.	General	extended	Higgs	sectors	have	gained	some	ground	in	2012	(increase	from	10%/11%,	as	first	choice	in	2011,	to	15%/14%	in	2012).			
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Fig.10	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	most	likely	model	
for	physics	beyond	the	Standard	Model.	Only	answers	with	relation	to	the	electroweak	symmetry	
breaking	are	given,	the	remaining	50/58%	refer	to	different	models	(Questionnaire	of	2012).			In	contrast,	the	fraction	of	physicists	considering	dynamical	EWSB	as	the	best	chance	was	reduced	to	almost	half	between	2011	and	2012.	Just	10%/4%	of	theorists/	experimentalists	advocated	for	it	after	the	observation	of	a	Higgs	candidate	(previously	16%/7%).	Even	in	spite	of	the	limited	parameter	space	of	composite	Higgs	models,	the	number	of	proponents	was	still	remarkable	among	theorists.	The	replies	to	the	question	‚Independently	of	your	expectations	regarding	LHC	results,	which	(if	any)	of	the	following	
models	do	you	prefer?’	(Fig.	11),	hardly	changed.	There	was	only	a	small	decrease	in	the	responses	for	dynamical	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	(14%/5%	after	19%/7%	in	2011).	Thus,	a	significant	minority	among	theorists	prefers	a	solution	of	EWSB	that	is	different	from	the	Higgs	mechanism,	even	though	many	do	not	believe	this	to	be	realised	at	LHC	energies.	This	testifies	the	tenacity	of	theories	that	are	attractive	on	internal	grounds,	that	have	strong	pragmatic	virtues,	notwithstanding	negative	empirical	results	as	long	as	there	remain	at	least	some	options	to	adapt	them	to	the	data.	(cf.	5.1.3.)		
		
Fig.11	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	preferred	model	
for	physics	beyond	the	Standard	Model.	Only	answers	with	relation	to	the	electroweak	symmetry	
breaking	are	given,	the	remaining	50/58%	refer	to	different	models	(Questionnaire	of	2012).			
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6.1.3	How	was	the	naturalness	problem	seen	after	the	Higgs	candidate?		With	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	candidate,	i.e.	the	likely	existence	of	an	elementary	scalar,	it	appeared	that	the	naturalness	problem	had	changed	from	a	potential	problem	to	an	actual	one.	It	could	no	longer	resolve	itself	by	the	absence	of	a	scalar	from	the	set	of	fundamental	particles.	Furthermore,	no	BSM	signal	had	been	found	to	alleviate	these	concerns.	We	therefore	tried	to	understand	whether	the	physicists’	assessment	had	changed	after	the	Higgs	discovery.		 	As	in	2011,	physicists	were	asked	for	the	criteria,	‘which	have	guided’	their	selection	of	the	preferred	model,	irrespective	of	the	chances	of	confirming	it	at	LHC.	(Fig.	12)	The	attitude	towards	naturalness,	however	had	hardly	changed	after	the	observation	of	a	Higgs	candidate.	Naturalness	was	mentioned	in	17%/18%	of	all	answers,	only	mildly	behind	the	criterion	of	‚elegance’	(20%/17%),	but	clearly	ahead	of	simplicity	(12%/10%).				
		
Fig.12	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	criteria	to	choose	
the	preferred	model	(Questionnaire	of	2012).	The	three	choices	were	added	up.		The	other	question	pertinent	to	assessing	the	physicists’	attitude	towards	naturalness	was	again	the	‘most	critical	flaw	of	the	Standard	Model’.	(Fig	13)	As	in	the	2011	survey	up	to	three	choices	could	be	given.	As	before	‘quadratic	divergences	in	corrections	to	
Higgs	mass’	remained	at	15%/11%	(compared	to	14%/10%	in	2011)	as	one	of	the	three	major	flaws.	Also	most	of	the	other	assessments	were	fairly	similar.	A	notable	exception	was	that	experimentalists	now	tended	to	consider	the	absence	of	a	dark	matter	candidate’	(21%	after	17%)	to	become	more	critical.	In	both	cases	the	replies	from	theorists	did	not	change	significantly.	After	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson,	it	seems,	experimentalists	shifted	their	interest	to	the	next	problem,	which	they	thought	to	be	in	reach	of	the	LHC,	dark	matter,	even	though	there	was	no	consensus	about	a	suitable	theoretical	model,	or	whether	such	a	dark	matter	candidate	would	be	at	all	in	the	energy	range	of	the	LHC.		
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Fig.13	Percentage	of	answers	of	theorists	(blue)	and	experimentalists	(red)	on	the	criteria	to	choose	
the	preferred	model	(Questionnaire	of	2012).	The	three	answers	were	added	up	and	normalized.	
Note	that	the	classifications	are	abbreviated	the	exact	questions	are	listed	in	Appendix		2		Both	questions	show	that	the	perceived	importance	of	the	naturalness	problem	has	not	been	affected	by	the	change	in	the	problem’s	specific	status.	A	possible	reason	for	this	stability	is	that	epistemic	and	pragmatic	criteria,	once	adopted	by	the	community,	usually	operate	on	a	longer	time	scale.	It	takes	a	certain	record	of	scientific	successes	to	support	them	–	as	has	been	the	case	with	the	naturalness	principle,	at	least	in	the	eyes	of	the	particle	physics	community.25		That	said,	one	may	expect	that	after	years	of	unsuccessful	searches	for	BSM	physics,	naturalness	would	become	much	less	attractive.				
6.2	Outcome	from	interviews	in	the	light	of	the	discovery		As	in	2011	the	questionnaire	was	complemented	by	interviews,	this	time	with	five	theorists	and	two	experimentalists.	Only	one	of	them	had	already	been	interviewed	in	2011;	this	time	more	emphasis	was	given	to	less	senior	physicists.	The	interviews	took	place	in	autumn	2012.		A	large	part	of	the	interviewees	characterized	the	Higgs	discovery	as	an	‘exciting’	event	that	would	have	decisive	implications	on	future	research.	Overwhelmingly	physicists	cautioned	to	jump	to	immediate	conclusions	about	the	details	of	the	SM	Higgs	boson.	One	interview	partner	expressed	this	very	clearly	‘well,	we	still	do	not	know	what	we	
observed’.		But:	‘It	would	have	surprised	me	more	if	it	would	not	be	it	[the	Higgs	boson].	
This	is	in	some	sense	paradoxial,	since	it	is	just	something	one	got	used	to’.	Despite	all	caution	there	was	agreement	about	the	next	steps.			
	
6.2.1	From	the	observation	to	scrutiny		The	focus,	both	experimentally	and	theoretically,	was	now	to	qualify	this	boson	and	look	whether	it	was	the	SM	Higgs	boson	or	whether	it	had	new	physics	in	its	wake.	An	experimentalist	noted	’At	this	stage	we	observe	a	new	particle	…	with	properties																																																									25	Guidice	(2008)	shows	that	there	the	record	of	the	naturalness	principle	becomes	mixed	if	one	assumes	a	broader	perspective;	and	one	might	even	consider	the	fortunes	of	fine-tuning	arguments	more	general.	However,	we	are	restricting	our	considerations	to	the	understanding	and	role	of	naturalness	within	the	community	of	elementary	particle	physicists.	
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consistent	with	the	Standard	Model	Higgs.	This	can	change	….	if	we	find	something	that	
does	not	fit	into	the	Standard	Model’.	But	also	theory	is	required	to	improve	the	precision	of	the	predictions	of	Higgs	properties	‘If	you	don’t	see	new	physics	directly,	then	maybe	we	
see	it	through	precision	measurements,	….	indirect	tests.’			In	this	sense,	the	new	particle	is	seen	as	a	potential	harbinger	of	new	physics,	not	the	closure	of	a	research	program.	‘Higgs	physics’	changed	from	searching	for	the	Higgs	boson	towards	measuring	the	properties	of	the	new	particle,	assuming	it	to	be	‘largely’	the	Higgs	boson,	but	also	searching	for	deviations	from	its	precisely	predictable	properties.				
6.2.2	The	implication	on	other	models		As	discussed	above,	Supersymmetry	predicted	the	Higgs	boson	to	be	lighter	than	130	GeV.	It	would	have	been	in	deep	troubles,	had	the	Higgs	been	found	at	a	larger	mass.	After	unsuccessful	searches	for	direct	signs	of	Supersymmetry,	the	mere	consistency	of	the	measurements	with	its	prediction,	was	taken	as	indirect	support.	One	theorist	says‘if	
it	had	been	140	GeV	or	150	–	that	would	have	changed	a	lot,	because	then	my	SUSY-models	
would	all	be	dead.	And	I	would	stop	working	on	them.’			Another	impact	of	the	Higgs	discovery	on	BSM	models	is	that,	within	the	experimental	uncertainties,	it	provides	additional	constraints.	Indeed,	in	this	perspective	‘the	
discovery	of	the	Higgs’	is	the	main…	result	that	influences	our	work’,	a	theorist	explained;	‘when	we	[work	on]	models	we	have	to	take…	into	account	…		this	particle	and	this	
changes…	the	situation	definitely’.	Its	existence	and	even	the	marginal	precision	of	autumn	2012	constrains	the	allowed	parameter	space	of	BSM	models,	‘the	determination	
of	parameters	of	models	or	the	testing	of	models	I	continue	to	do,	now	including	the	
information	from	the	Higgs.	And	that	has	changed	something	in	the	interpretation’.	E.g.	to	determine	the	allowed	parameter	space	in	supersymmetric	models.	‘What	would	be	a	
125	GeV	Higgs	[in	super	symmetry]?	Of	course,	a	SUSY	Higgs,	but	what	a	parameter	space	
would	be	compatible	with	this?	It	would	be	a	very	small	one.’	In	this	sense	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	candidate	has	severe	implications	for	many	models,	at	least	in	limiting	significantly	the	allowed	parameter	range.	This	is	of	course	an	effect	that	becomes	poignant	on	a	larger	timescale	when	it	may	eventually	squeeze	out	certain	models	entirely.	Such	an	effect	was	not	yet	visible	in	the	changes	of	model	preference	between	the	2011	and	2012	questionnaires.				
6.2.3	Shedding	doubt	on	the	previous	guiding	principle	of	naturalness?		As	mentioned	in	5.1.3,	the	naturalness	problem	in	2012	turned	from	fiction	to	reality.	This	can	also	be	gathered	from	the	interviews.		‘I	would	say	that	now	that	it	is	certain	
that	there	is	a	Higgs	state	at	this	mass,	[the	naturalness	problem]	is	more	alive	than	ever’.	And	at	least	some	continue	to	consider	it	an	important	question.	Naturalness	‘is	still	an	
important	argument.	I	cannot	see	any	reason, why	should	happen	something	like	that,	such	
[fine	–	tuning]	just	in	a	natural	way.	….	we	put	this	fine-tuning	by	hand,	…	it	cannot	happen	
in	nature.’			Naturalness	continues	to	be	seen	as	an	important	guiding	principle	for	the	development	of	BSM	models.	’’We	need	the	guidelines.	Because,	it’s	not	just	the	experiment,	it’s	not	just	
mathematics.	It’s	something,	which	is	between	induction	and	deduction.	…	And	you	need	…	
some	guidelines.	One	guideline	could	be	this	naturalness,	…	which	is	a	theoretical	guideline.	
Or,	‘minimality’,	one	theorist	argued,	that	is,	for	a	model	to	have	the	minimal	number	of	
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free	parameters.		However,	this	was	not	the	only	reaction.	The	unnaturalness	of	the	SM	becomes	more	acute	since	none	of	the	anticipated	solutions	in	terms	of	New	Physics	has	shown	up	in	the	energy	range	where	it	was	expected,	a	fact	that	was	considered	highly	disturbing.	This	dilemma	leads	to	a	growing	discussion	about	the	status	of	the	naturalness	problem:	‘is	this	problem	a	real	problem	or	just	a	fantasy	of	theoretical	physicists?	….	I’ve	been	
trained	to	look	at	it	as	a	serious	problem’.	Yet	another	theorist	raises	doubts:	‘what	we	
thought	was	a	main	motivation	to	expect	Supersymmetry	at	the	LHC,	this	hierarchy	
problem	or	naturalness	problem,	….	I’m	not	so	sure	anymore	whether	this	is	actually	
something	that	leads	us	into	the	right	direction.’	‘People	have	just	accepted	the	fact	that	
there	is	more	and	more	fine-tuning	now,	because	of	the	limits	that	become	larger	and	
larger.	And	it’s	not	so	clear	to	me	whether	it’s	still	a	good	idea	to	consider	that’.	Similarly	another	theorist	argued,	‘We	can	discuss	whether…	we	have	to	accept	fine-tuning.	What	
could	be	behind	a	fine-tuning	…	or	if	one	wants	a	natural	theory	without	fine-tuning.		…	
This	is	the	main	argument	which	…	I	think,	drove	…	the	theoretical	community	for	the	last	
twenty	or	thirty	years.	But	it’s	not	a	solid	argument’.		To	sum	up,	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson,	together	with	the	absence	of	any	sign	of	new	physics,	has	turned	naturalness	from	a	potential	into	a	real	theoretical	problem.	While	before	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	physicists	might	have	expected	that	naturalness	could	be	restored	by	a	different	mechanism	of	EWSB,	LHC	has	now	confirmed	the	unnatural	Higgs	mechanism,	yet	without	finding	evidence	for	a	potential	solution	outside	the	EWSB	sector.	It	is	true,	naturalness	could	still	serve	as	a	guideline	for	devising	new	models.	But	the	absence	of	a	cure	for	the	naturalness	problem	of	the	SM	has	made	some	physicists	wonder	whether	it	is	actually	a	deep	problem	or	whether	one	should	simply	accept	fine-tuning	as	a	fact	about	nature	and	accept	models	that	violate	naturalness.	Therefore,	the	naturalness	problem	was	still	considered	to	be	important	in	the	questionnaires,	but	the	interviews	showed	that	its	previous	importance	was	put	into	question.	Throughout	the	interviews,	there	was	no	indication	that	physicists	considered	the	naturalness	problem	as	multifaceted	or	vague.	Instead	they	interchangeably	denoted	it	as	hierarchy	problem,	fine-tuning,	or	quadratic	divergences.	In	Section	7.4.,	we	will	discuss	how	this	coherence	in	scientific	practice	squares	with	the	differences	in	philosophical	analysis.		
	
7.	Some	philosophical	lessons	
	In	this	Section	we	interpret	the	outcome	of	interviews	and	questionnaires	in	light	of	the	questions	mentioned	in	the	Introduction.		
7.1	Scepticism	before	and	after	a	crucial	test	
	In	retrospect,	it	might	appear	that	the	Higgs	discovery	had	been	largely	expected.	Our	studies	show	that,	in	actual	fact,	the	expectations	of	the	LHC	physicists	were	fairly	diverse.	At	least	shortly	before	a	Higgs	candidate	was	discovered,	the	community	was	basically	split	whether	to	expect	the	observation	of	a	SM	Higgs	or	not.	(cf.	5.1.2)	They	all	were	aware	that	LHC	had	sufficient	luminosity	to	accomplish	such	a	crucial	test.	The	reluctance	to	embrace	the	SM	Higgs	boson	is	in	line	with	wide-spread	criticism	of	the	conceptual	structure	of	the	Higgs	mechanism.	None	of	the	interviewees	emphasised	its	theoretical	elegance,	some	even	considered	it	an	ad-hoc	argument.	This	reluctance	is	in	contrast	to	especially	Supersymmetry,	which	is	frequently	considered	as	too	beautiful	a	theory	that	nature	should	not	have	chosen	it	–	regardless	whether	it	is	realised	in	the	LHC	energy	range.	The	proponents	of	the	Higgs	mechanism	simply	regarded	it	as	the	
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‘best’	solution	for	mass	generation	that	had	come	to	the	physicists’	mind	over	the	course	of	more	than	four	decades.	It	did	not	contradict	any	measurement,	was	compatible	with	a	wider	theory,	and	had	only	relatively	few	parameters.			On	the	other	hand,	after	a	candidate	with	the	‘right’	mass	and	with	properties	consistent	with	the	expectations	had	been	observed,	most	LHC	physicists	almost	immediately	embraced	the	notion	that	‘a’	Higgs	boson	had	been	found	–	although	they	left	it	open	whether	it	would	be	the	only	one.	This	overwhelming	acceptance	came,	although	the	precision	of	the	measurements	still	left	quite	some	room	for	alternative	solutions	of	EWSB.	(cf.	6.1.1.	&	6.2.1)	In	fact,	one	of	the	main	research	directions	after	the	observation	of	the	Higgs	candidate,	both	experimentally	and	theoretically,	became	to	scrutinize	how	large	a	parameter	space	for	alternative	solutions	would	be	left.	Whereas	the	vast	majority	did	not	consider	solutions	radically	different	from	the	SM,	such	as	a	composite	scalar,	as	realistic,	there	was	considerable	hope	to	find	deviations	from	the	SM	expectations	that	would	give	physicists	a	hint	how	to	further	investigate	the	complex	landscape	of	BSM	models.	(cf.	6.1.2)	When	doing	so,	most	data	analyses	after	2012	assumed	the	existence	of	a	SM	Higgs	boson	at	125	GeV,	at	least	as	the	best	approximation	of	the	observed	boson.	This	represented	a	significant	discontinuity	in	the	actual	experimental	strategy.				
7.2.	Was	the	Higgs	Discovery	a	Crucial	Experiment?		In	the	interviews,	the	discovery	of	a	Higgs	boson	was	widely	considered	as	extremely	important	for	particle	physics.	This	accords	with	the	many	statements	in	the	literature	during	the	last	decades26	and	the	significant	material	and	intellectual	resources	that	went	into	large	experimental	facilities	to	solve	the	problem	of	EWSB.	This	widely	shared	conviction	among	physicists	that	the	problem	of	EWSB	was	at	the	crossroads	of	particle	physics	at	large	prompts	the	question	as	to	whether	the	Higgs	discovery	represented	a	crucial	experiment	in	a	philosophical	perspective?	In	Section	3.2	and	3.3,	we	have	discussed	underdetermination	and	its	impact	on	the	feasibility	of	crucial	experiments	and	other	ground-breaking	experiments.		In	this	section,	we	argue	that	the	underdetermination	argument	can	be	contained	to	such	an	extent	that	it	does	not	play	a	role	in	actual	scientific	practice.	On	this	basis	we	also	argue	that	the	Higgs	discovery	can	indeed	be	considered	as	a	crucial	experiment.	Even	though	the	Higgs	discovery	–	as	shown	in	Section	7.1	and	emphasised	in	many	physics	papers	–	was	not	a	simple	yes/no	experiment,	its	cruciality,	to	our	mind,	rests	upon	the	following	characteristics:		 a. The	Higgs	boson	was	an	essential	and	indispensable	element	of	the	SM.	Moreover,	the	Higgs	discovery	was	the	final	confirmation	of	a	theoretical	framework	that	had	been	developed	over	decades.	Of	course,	the	SM	would	also	have	broken	down	if,	e.g.	no	Z0	boson	would	have	been	found.	But	the	Higgs,	belongs	to	a	sector	of	the	SM	that	had	not	been	seen	before	and	is	based	on	the	additional	concept	of	spontaneous	symmetry	breaking,	for	which	no	evidence	had	been	observed	before.			b. The	Higgs	boson	is	fundamentally	different	from	all	particles	found	up	to	date	because	it	is	an	elementary	scalar.	It	is	not	the	first	scalar	found,	but	e.g.	the	pion	has	been	shown	to	be	composed	of	two	quarks	and	gluons.																																																											26	See,	e.g.	Ellis,	J.,	Gaillard,	M.K.,	and	Nanopoulos	D.V.	(2012),	Quigg	(2007).	
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c. In	view	of	the	importance	of	the	EWSB	mechanism,	a	plethora	of	alternative	models	had	been	constructed.	The	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	basically	eliminated	several	families	of	these	alternative	models,	and	reshaped	the	direction	of	future	research	in	a	fundamental	way.			Whereas	a.	and	b.	emphasise	the	crucial	importance	of	a	Higgs	discovery	for	the	SM	and	the	general	concept	of	elementary	particle,	characteristic	c.	widens	the	traditional	philosophical	understanding	of	crucial	experiments	which	required	that	only	one	model	survives.	However,	even	if	some	alternatives	may	remain	viable,	the	crucial	experiment	drastically	reshapes	the	field.	In	the	next	paragraphs	we	argue	that	the	crucial	nature	of	an	experiment	as	complex	as	LHC	has	to	be	judged	against	the	backdrop	of	the	historical	development	of	the	respective	field.			Let	us	assess	the	acceptance	of	the	observed	particle	being	a	Higgs	in	more	detail.	Immediately	after	the	announcement	at	CERN	in	2012	and	the	first	measurements	of	its	mass	and	decay	modes,	there	was	a	flood	of	theoretical	analyses,	significantly	reducing	the	possible	parameter	space	of	the	many	previously	developed	BSM	models.	Some	models,	among	them	‘higgsless	models’	and	‘higgs-gauge	unification’,	were	strongly	disfavoured	and	did	not	play	a	role	in	the	subsequent	discussions.	Others,	like	2HDM	were	more	difficult	to	reject	at	this	stage.	As	becomes	apparent	from	the	questionnaire,	even	only	a	few	months	after	the	discovery	was	announced,	alternative	models	for	EWSB	were	only	expected	by	less	than	10%	of	the	respondents.	(cf.	6.1.1.).			During	the	following	year	–	with	more	data	being	analysed	and	additional	properties	being	searched	for,	especially	the	spin	–	the	notion	of	‘having	found	a	Higgs	boson’	was	adopted	by	the	majority	of	the	LHC	physicists.	The	notion	of	‘a’	Higgs	boson	leaves	open	the	option	of	having	a	more	complicated	Higgs	sector	than	the	SM	Higgs.	In	principle	this	can	be	resolved	by	higher	experimental	precision	and	additional	searches,	however,	the	precision	will	never	be	perfect	in	the	future,	such	that	small	deviations	from	the	SM	Higgs	cannot	be	ruled	out	with	100%	certainty.			In	this	situation	physicists	are	moving	forward	in	their	research	accepting	the	SM	Higgs	boson	to	exist.	This	consensus	was	not	based	on	logical	inference,	in	the	sense	that	physicists	waited	until	all	alternative	solutions	were	definitively	excluded.27	It	contained	a	certain	dose	of	pragmatism	in	choosing	promising	research	strategies.	Such	a	‘pragmatic	solution’	to	the	Duhem-Neurath-Quine	problem,	as	Franklin	and	Perovic	(2015,	84)	have	aptly	put	it,	does	not	preclude	intensive	future	scrutiny	of	the	signal	both	from	an	experimental	and	theoretical	side.	Just	the	opposite:	this	scrutiny	leads	to	the	emergence	of	a	very	significant	new	research	direction.	This	persistent	search	for	potential	deviations	is	not,	to	our	mind,	in	conflict	with	the	Higgs	discovery	being	crucial.	To	the	contrary,	such	explorative	searches	that	do	not	test	models	already	proposed	by	theorists,	can	be	seen	as	one	way	to	address	the	problem	of	unconceived	alternatives.			Let	us	discuss	now	more	specifically	how	Duhemian	underdetermination	is	openly	addressed	within	the	statistical	data	analysis.	First,	the	discrimination	of	two	(or	several)	hypotheses,	framed	in	an	identical	theoretical	environment,	as	the	SM	in	particle	physics,	with	the	same	(kind)	of	experiments	is	(almost)	completely	free	of	detailed	theoretical	considerations.	For	in	such	cases	the	well	accepted	and	identical	procedures	are	applied	to	either	of	the	hypotheses.	Duhemian	underdetermination	and																																																									27	Wüthrich	(2016)	advocates	a	notion	of	diagnostic	causal	inference	that	partially	dispenses	with	the	explicit	assumption	of	theories	without	sacrificing	talk	about	causality	in	particle	scattering.	
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theory-ladenness	are	shielded	off	by	referring	in	the	same	way	to	an	entire	experimental	set-up.	This	vastly	reduces	their	sway	among	scientists.28	Second,	theory	ladenness	is	significantly	alleviated	by	using	precision	data	from	LHC	and	other	experiments	and	the	familiarity	with	experimental	strategies,	among	them	the	rules	of	data	analysis	and	the	knowledge	about	background	processes.	The	Higgs	discovery,	accordingly,	was	part	and	parcel	of	a	longer	tradition	of	accelerator	experiments	and	the	associated	theoretical	research	programs.			One	can	formalize	the	physicists’	handling	of	Duhem’s	problem	as	such.	We	denote	the	observed	number	of	events	of	a	certain	signature29	of	scattering	process	by	O,	T1	and	T2	are	two	theoretical	hypotheses	and	Ai	a	set	of	auxiliary	hypotheses.	The	Pi	denote	the	predictions	to	measure	a	number	of	events	given	hypothesis	Ti	and	the	auxiliary	hypotheses.	We	then	have30	in	a	simplified	notation	omitting	the	uncertainties	of	Ti,	Ai	,				(T1	&	A1	&	A2	&	A3	&				……	An)				|=	P1,					O	|=	P1		Duhem	argues	correctly	that	O	can	also	be	inferred	from	(e.g.)			(T2	&	A1	&	A2	&	A3*&				……	An)				|=	P1,					O	|=	P1		A3*	being	an	alternative	auxiliary	hypothesis.	The	two-pronged	strategy	by	which	particle	physicists	deal	with	the	Duhem	problem	can	be	expressed	as	such.	Using	the	identical	auxiliary	hypotheses	for	an	experimental	and	theoretical	environment	allows	one	to	test	T1	and	T2.	Most	importantly,	each	of	the	auxiliary	hypotheses	has	been	experimentally	tested	under	multiple	conditions.	Theoretical	assumptions	are	kept	minimal	and,	if	needed,	they	also	have	been	tested	extensively.	Therefore	A3*	can	be	excluded,	leading	to		(T2	&	A1	&	A2	&	A3	&				……	An)				|=	P2,							O~|=	P2,		which	allows	physicists	eventually	to	discriminate	between	T1	and	T2.		Let	us	be	more	specific	about	the	auxiliary	hypotheses.	They	include	the	known	physics,	rules	of	data	analysis,	criteria	of	statistical	significance	(cf.	Beauchemin	2017).	Some	of	these	auxiliary	hypotheses	have	been	extensively	tested	before	LHC	was	even	built,	others	can	be	tested	in–situ	using	the	redundancy	of	LHC	experiments.		In	the	actual	practice	of	particle	physics,	the	Ti	and	Ai	are	only	known	to	some	statistical	and	systematic	uncertainty.	This	implies	that	also	the	predictions	Pi	have	uncertainties,	i.e.	(Pi	±δi),	where	the	δi	are	convolutions	of	the	uncertainties	of	the	individual	Ai	and	Ti.	As	a	result,	instead	of	a	strict	agreement	or	disagreement	of	the	predictions	with	the	observation	O,	only	a	finite	likelihood	pi(O|	Pi) can	be	assigned	taking	into	account	the	uncertainty	of	Pi.	Duhem’s	problem	therefore	reappears	in	probabilistic	terms.	To	keep	underdetermination	at	bay,	to	resolve	Duhem’s	problem	in	scientific	practive,	two	additional	conditions	must	be	met.	The	first	one	is	to	confirm	not	only	the	correctness	of	the	Ai,	but	also	all	their	individual	uncertainties.	This	is	done	simultaneously	with	the																																																									28	Assuming	the	proper	functioning	of	cables	and	switches	is	not	to	say	that	such	errors	do	not	occur.	But	it	seems	to	us	that	those	are	not	the	kind	of	victories	that	advocates	of	a	strong	global	notion	of	underdetermination	(cf.	3.2.)	would	want	to	score.	As	Franklin	(2013)	shows,	interesting	failures	of	experiments	are	of	a	different	kind.	29	We	will	provide	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	role	of	signatures	in	a	subsequent	paper	that	draws	on	the	respective	material	from	the	questionnaire	and	the	interviews.	30	Note	that	|=	does	not	amount	to	deductive	entailment	in	the	original	Duhemian	sense.		
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extensive	tests	of	the	Ai	(cf.	Mättig	2019).	Secondly,	this	probabilistic	reasoning	may	in	a	strict	(and	naïve)	manner	be	interpreted	as	impossibility	to	decide	between	T1	and	T2,	even	if	p2	is	ridiculously	small,	say	10-40.	To	‘exclude’	such	meaningless	hypotheses	Ti,	the	actual	scientific	practice	defines	conventions	on	the	minimum	magnitude	of	the	pi	to	accept	a	hypothesis.		This	shows	that	by	embedding	the	actual	experiment	into	a	broader	context	and	by	distinguishing	the	different	layers	of	theorizing	and	experimentation,	crucial	experiments	are	possible.	Duhem’s	underdetermination	can	be	addressed	in	scientific	practice.	This	also	agrees	with	Weber’s	intuition	discussed	in	Sect.	3.3.	that	experiments	are	embedded	into	a	broader	experimental	program	and	partially	takes	up	Baetu’s	point	that	such	a	program	may	not	only	contain	the	purported	crucial	experiment.	LHC	has	always	tested	other	models	and	done	exploratory	searches	alongside	testing	the	SM.		Having	dealt	with	Duhem’s	problem,	let	us	discuss	more	generally	what	it	takes	to	make	an	experiment	in	particle	physics	crucial.	The	Higgs	discovery	clearly	was	essential	for	the	SM,	but	why	was	is	not	simply	a	‘persuasive	experiment’	in	the	sense	of	Franklin	and	Perovic?	(cf.	3.3)	After	all,	different	mechanisms	of	EWSB	are	still	being	discussed	even	though	–	as	we	have	seen	in	Sect.	6.1.	–	they	are	starting	to	draw	less	interest.	Franklin	and	Perovic’s	distinction	is	based	on	the	complexity	of	the	inference	|=	and	the	number	of	auxiliary	hypotheses	required.	But	this	seems	to	be	problematic	for	large	experiments	like	LHC	that	use	many	auxiliary	hypotheses	that	are	tested	by	different	research	groups.	Taking	into	account	also	their	analysis	of	the	Stern-Gerlach	experiment,	it	appears	to	us	that	the	requirement	of	an	immediate	acceptance	or	refutation	of	competing	models	makes	the	notion	of	a	crucial	experiment	subject	to	matters	of	short-term	historical	developments	in	the	sense	that	that	the	status	of	the	P	violation	experiment	could	have	changed	if	some	months	later	some	alternative	explanation	had	emerged	that	required	further	experiments	to	be	excluded.	Would	the	discovery	of	CP	violation	turn	into	a	crucial	experiment,	if	those	alternatives	had	been	devised	before	the	experiment?	Does	the	‘cruciality	‘of	an	experiment	depend	on	the	number	of	models	developed	before	and	afterwards?			On	the	basis	of	these	classical	examples	from	particle	physics,	we	are	thus	suggesting	a	notion	of	crucial	experiment	that	is	closer	to	experimental	practice	and	less	dependent	on	short-term	developments	in	physical	theory.	This	notion	seems	to	us	also	in	the	spirit	of	Weber’s	(2009)	discussion.	But	we	are	well	aware	that	a	substantive	discussion	of	our	proposal	would	require	a	broader	set	of	examples,	both	positive	and	negative	ones.			An	experiment	with	a	systematically	and	statistically	significant	outcome,	is	crucial	in	some	field	of	science,	if	it	is		a) seminal	or	decisive	for	the	further	development	of	this	field,		and	at	least	one	of	the	following	criteria	are	fulfilled.	b) It	adds	a	new	concept	to	the	body	of	physics,		c) it	implies	a	rejection	of	one	or	several	theoretical	solutions	of	a	significant	problem,	or	refutes	an	established	concept.		The	third	criterion	takes	up	characteristic	b.	in	the	above	description	of	the	Higgs	discovery.	In	the	examples	discussed,	P	and	CP	violation	fulfil	criteria	a)	and	c),	the	Stern-Gerlach	experiment	fulfilled	criteria	a),	b),	c)	before	the	advent	of	quantum	mechanics,	fulfilled	a),	c)	until	spin	was	fully	integrated	into	the	theory,	after	which	it	fulfilled	a)	and	b)31.	The	Higgs	discovery	fulfilled	a)	and	b)	by	itself,	but	it	also	refuted	alternative	models,	such	that	it	also	fulfils	c).																																																									31	In	contrast	to	Franklin	and	Perovic,	we	believe	that	the	experiment’s	crucial	character	was	present	throughout.	Initially,	the	experiment	was	proof	of	the	phenomenon	of	space	quantization	
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7.3.	Principles	and	values	of	model	choice		The	questionnaires	and	the	interviews	have	shown	that	in	2011	there	was	a	large	variety	of	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values	guiding	the	physicists’	expectations	about	the	Higgs	searches,	their	concerns	about	the	SM	and	their	preferences	for	BSM	physics.	The	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	disfavoured	certain	models	and	strengthened	the	genuinely	epistemic	criteria.	The	example	of	dynamical	symmetry	breaking	after	the	Higgs	discovery	showed	that	theoretical	simplicity	or	other	pragmatic	criteria,	e.g.	fertility	to	calculate	further	particle	masses,	can	motivate	researchers	even	if	the	respective	model	is	experimentally	disfavoured.	This	corresponds	to	Kuhn’s	insight	that	the	balancing	of	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values	is	neither	a	perfect	logical	inference	nor	a	matter	of	taste,	but	a	fact	in	the	history	of	scientific	practice.	Even	though	physicists	are	now	largely	accepting	the	SM	as	one	of	the	most	successful	theories,	they	will	keep	looking	for	deviations	that	promise	to	be	interesting.			Even	taking	into	account	tight	experimental	constraints,	the	‘expectation’	to	find	dynamical	EWSB	was	still	significant	among	theorists	before	the	observation	of	the	Higgs	candidate.	It	decreased	after	the	observation,	but	remained	remarkably	high.	Interestingly,	the	preference	among	theoreticians	was,	both	in	2011	and	2012,	always	higher	when	asked	‘independently	of	LHC’.	(cf.	5.1.3.	&	6.1.2.)	Even	though	the	chances	for	experimental	evidence	in	the	near	future	were	low,	dynamical	EWSB	remained	a	preferred	solution	for	many.	Notably,	the	preference	of	dynamical	EWSB	showed	the	largest	difference	in	the	surveys	between	experimentalists	and	theorists.				Let	us	evaluate	possible	consequences	of	applying	the	notion	of	values	of	preference	to	models	instead	of	theories.	Not	all	BSM	models	are	as	close	to	the	status	of	a	theory	as	the	SM.	Some	of	them	are	renormalizable	and	based	on	a	sufficiently	elaborated	theoretical	idea,	such	as	Supersymmetry.	But	others	are	not;	there	is,	for	instance,	considerable	freedom	in	populating	an	extended	Higgs	sector.	This	does	not	prevent	physicists	from	considering	such	models	as	worthy	of	pursuit,	from	choosing	to	investigate	them,	and	indicate	their	motives	for	doing	so.	Finding	evidence	for	such	models	would	certainly	have	prompted	theoretical	investigations	before	physicists	would	commit	themselves	to	the	truth	of	that	model	in	the	same	sense	as	one	might	commit	oneself	the	existence	of	supersymmetry	in	nature.	We	do	not	see	this	as	a	weakness	of	our	account,	but	as	a	consequence	of	the	variegated	model	landscape.			Let	us	now	look	at	our	findings	from	the	perspective	of	Douglas’s	classification	of	cognitive	and	pragmatic	values.	All	models	are	physically	consistent	and	are	empirically	adequate	in	the	sense	that	they	are	not	in	conflict	with	the	existing	data.	Thus,	they	fulfil	the	minimal	criteria	(i)	and	(ii),	They	also	make	specific	predictions32	and	have	a	high	predictive	accuracy	once	basic	parameter(s)	are	fixed.		Furthermore,	there	is	a	consensus	in	the	importance	of	the	mechanism	of	EWSB.	They	are	thus	fulfilling	the																																																																																																																																																															predicted	by	the	Bohr-Sommerfeld	theory	and	a	refutation	of	the	classical	views	developed	by	Larmor.	However,	within	quantum	mechanics	the	concept	of	space	quantization	was	replaced	by	a	somewhat	different	notion	of	angular	momentum,	but	this	did	not	end	the	experiments	crucial	significance	against	pre-quantum	theories	(c).	When	quantum	mechanics	was	fully	established,	including	spin,	there	was	so	much	spectroscopic	evidence	against	the	pre-quantum	physics	that	the	Stern-Gerlach	experiment	became	less	important	in	this	respect	(ending	c)),	but	paradigmatic	for	the	phenomenon	of	spin	(fulfilling	b	with	respect	to	this	concept).	32	The	fractions	of	physicists	choosing	‘fit	to	data’	and	‘specific	predictions’	seems	to	be	lower	than	one	might	expect	but	has	to	be	seen	on	the	background	of	these	being	not	special	to	any	model	considered.		
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desiderata	(iv).	The	questionnaire	has	also	revealed	a	high	score	for	genuinely	pragmatic	values	that	fall	in	Douglas’s	category	(iii)	and	we	have	argued	that	they	we	able	to	balance	the	bleak	empirical	prospects	for	certain	models	as	long	as	they	were	not	ruled	out	in	the	sense	of	the	minimal	criterion	(ii).	Douglas	admits	that	such	a	practice	is	legitimate	as	long	as	it	is	done	with	“the	full	acknowledgement	that	the	theory	is	inadequate	as	it	stands	and	that	is	must	be	corrected	to	meet	the	minimum	requirements	as	quickly	as	possible.”	(2013,	802)	She	also	admits	that	there	are	tensions	in	practice	“between	a	well-supported	theory	(with	group	(iv)	values	supporting	it)	and	an	underdeveloped	theory	(with	lots	of	group	(iii)	values	and	thus	lots	of	potential)”	(2013,	804).	But	these	tensions	are	only	pragmatic	ones	between	conservatives	and	risk	takers	that	do	not	endanger	the	separation	between	groups	(iii)	and	(iv)	because	they	“aim	at	different	purposes”	in	the	sense	that	“pragmatic	criteria	have	no	bearing	on	what	should	be	thought	of	as	our	best	supported	scientific	knowledge	at	the	moment.”	(2013,	804)		It	seems	to	us	that	when	applying	the	values	of	preference	to	a	complex	model	landscape,	matters	are	a	bit	more	complicated	and	Douglas’	classification	has	to	be	taken	with	a	grain	of	salt.	Let	us	start	with	the	claim	that	“groups	(i)	and	(ii)	…	trump	groups	(iii)	and	(iv)”	(2013,	804)	and	are	clearly	distinct	as	necessary	conditions	and	desiderata.	‘Internal	consistency’	(group	(i))	in	particle	physics	means	that	the	theory	is	free	of	any	infinities	and	can	be	extrapolated	to	energies	Λ	→∞.	Strictly	speaking,	given	the	measurements	of	the	Higgs	and	top	mass	this	may	even	not	be	true	for	the	SM	itself,	with	the	Higgs	potential	breaking	down	at	high	energy,	although	energies	significantly	beyond	the	Planck	scale	of	1019	GeV.	This	does	not	play	any	role	for	the	103	GeV	reachable	at	the	LHC	and	the	empirical	adequacy	of	the	theory	within	the	experimental	uncertainties.	However,	the	same	argument	applies	to	the	BSM	models	for	EWSB.	For	all	models,	some	energy	scale	Λ	is	introduced	at	which	some	theory	should	exist	–	with	properties	that	are	vaguely	known	-	and	where	it	is	assumed	to	be	fully	renormalizable.	This	Λ	is,	in	general,	far	beyond	the	reach	of	the	LHC	and	the	models	predict	just	some	’low	energy’	(i.e.	in	the	LHC	range)	phenomena,	where	the	details	of	the	full	high	energy	theory	do	not	play	a	role.	As	seen	in	the	questionnaires	and	the	interviews,	this	is	not	of	concern	for	physicists.	What	is	more	important	to	them	are	solutions	of	problems	like	dark	matter,	unification,	and	naturalness	(see	next	section),	but	also	pragmatic	criteria	like	simplicity	and	elegance.			In	all	these	models,	empirical	adequacy	is	guaranteed	by	constructing	them	so	as	to	encompass	the	SM	that	had	a	very	high	degree	of	experimental	confirmation,	except	for	the	Higgs	sector.	While	accordingly,	empirical	adequacy	is	accepted	as	a	preeminent	value,	in	the	practice	of	physicists,	internal	consistency	plays	only	a	role	if	it	prevents	clear	predictions.	This	means	that	group	(iv),	at	least	temporarily,	can	trump	group	1.	It	is	true,	physicists	are	fully	aware	of	this	fact,	however	to	reach	ΛBSM	may	take	decades,	if	not	centuries.	To	evade	this,	one	either	has	to	redefine	the	meaning	of	physical	consistency	or	retrigger	the	epistemic	values.	Wells	(2012)	considers	mathematical	consistency	(his	term	for	internal	consistency)	to	be	as	preeminent	as	empirical	consistency	(i.e.	adequacy),	while	not	denying	that	this	is	not	the	general	attitude	among	physicists.	To	implement	this	preference,	he	advocates	effective	field	theories	(EFT)	that	accomplish	internal	consistency	by	adding	an	infinite	series	of	additional	terms	made	up	of	all	fields	of	the	model,	implying	also	an	infinite	set	of	free	parameters.	Whereas	this	is	in	principle	correct	it	is	hardly	a	practice	followed	widely	in	particle	physics.	When	EFTs	are	considered	in	the	actual	practice,	only	a	limited	set	of	terms	is	used	destroying	the	mathematical	consistency	but	making	the	theory	tractable.		.		
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7.4	The	Guiding	Principle	‘Naturalness’	
	Our	questionnaire	has	shown	that	naturalness	is	indeed	on	a	par	with	the	traditional	pragmatic	values	of	‘elegance’	and	‘simplicity’	–	as	for	the	guiding	principles	of	model	preference	–	and	on	a	par	with	‘too	many	independent	parameters’,	the	‘missing	dark	matter	candidate’	and	the	‘non-inclusion	of	gravity’	–	as	for	the	most	critical	flaws	of	the	SM.	While	the	many	independent	parameters	render	the	SM	not	simple	–	for	decades	elementary	particle	physicists	have	been	looking	for	a	simple	unifying	theory	–	the	two	other	flaws	concern	empirical	facts	that	cannot	be	accommodated	by	the	SM.		From	the	interviews	(cf.	6.2.3)	we	have	concluded	that	naturalness	is	considered	as	sufficiently	well	entrenched	within	the	community	to	be	considered	as	a	coherent	guiding	principle	for	scientific	practice.	But	it	operates	both	in	an	epistemic	and	a	pragmatic	mode.			Renormalization	is	the	way	to	guarantee	the	finiteness	of	the	theory,	that	is,	its	theoretical	consistency.	In	principle	the	huge	‘unnatural’	renormalization	corrections	for	the	elementary	Higgs	boson	do	not	make	the	theory	inconsistent	in	a	strictly	formal	sense.	In	practice,	however,	most	physicists	find	this	inacceptable	-	they	do	not	accept	too	much	fine-tuning	of	SM	parameters	–	and	try	to	find	a	remedy	by	supplementing	the	SM.	This	renders	naturalness	an	epistemic	value,	in	Kuhn’s	and	Douglas’s	terminology.	However,	in	our	understanding,	naturalness	also	acts	a	pragmatic	value.	It	is	an	operationally	relatively	easy-to-apply	quantitative	criterion,	at	least	once	it	is	specified	how	much	fine-tuning	is	allowed,	and	it	constrains	models;	e.g.	it	suggests	new	particles	with	top	flavour	to	compensate	the	main	culprit	for	‘unnaturalness’.	This	may	also	be	the	reason	why	naturalness	is	maintained	as	an	important	criterion	to	devise	BSM	models.	Such	a	double-track	value	of	preference	complicates	the	grouping	of	values	for	model	preference.	There	is,	to	our	mind,	no	clear	separation	of	this	complex	criterion	into	more	elementary	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values.	For	despite	its	complexity,	naturalness	is	coherently	applied	as	guiding	principle	by	the	physics	community.	It	seems	to	us	that	this	diagnosis	does	not	contradict	the	philosophical	differentiations	advocated	by	Wells	and	Williams	(cf.	3.3).			With	the	Higgs	discovery	’naturalness’	turned	from	a	potential	problem	of	the	SM	into	a	real	one.	The	positive	empirical	finding	was	not	accompanied	by	an	observation	of	new	particles	in	the	TeV	range	that	could	resolve	the	problem	in	close	temporal	proximity	to	the	Higgs	discovery.	One	might	expect	that	after	confirming	the	cause	of	the	naturalness	problem,	its	solution	should	have	been	considered	as	more	urgent.	Such	a	trend	was	not	visible	in	the	questionnaire;	its	high	ranking	as	guiding	principle	or	most	critical	flaw	of	the	SM	did	not	change.	The	interviews	revealed	a	more	differentiated	picture33.	Some	physicists	still	regard	the	naturalness	problem	as	a	nuisance,	but	contemplate	that	it	might	be	an	accidental	feature	of	particle	physics	instead	of	a	solid	theoretical	argument.	In	a	sense,	physicists	are	becoming	prepared	to	live	with	it.34			The	resilience	of	the	naturalness	problem	may	result	from	the	fact	that	there	exists	no	clear	threshold	when	a	theory	becomes	‘unnatural’.	At	least	before	the	first	results	of	the	LHC	folklore	had	it	that	fine-tuning	requires	new	physics	at	an	energy	scale	of	1	TeV.	Yet	there	is	no	prohibitive	argument	against	changing	this	to	5	or	10	(or	more)	TeV,	even	if	this	increases	the	amount	of	fine-tuning.	Therefore,	with	some	adjustments,	the	naturalness	problem	can	still	be	maintained	for	the	forthcoming	LHC	data;	moreover,	also	the	parameter	space	for	new	physics	at	the	1	TeV	scale	has	not	been	completely																																																									33	This	agrees	with	several	articles	by	physicists	reconsidering	the	Naturalness	problem,	e.g.	Guidice	(2013),	Dine	(2015).	34	Cf.	Friederich,	Harlander&	Karaca	(2014,	Sect.	7).	
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covered	by	previous	searches.	Thus,	many	physicists	defer	the	final	word	on	the	importance	of	naturalness	to	the	higher	energies	and	intensities	that	the	LHC	is	about	to	enter.	It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	BSM	physics	is	found	that	indeed	can	cure	the	naturalness	problem,	If	not,	one	may	wonder	how	far	the	scale	of	new	physics	can	be	stretched	or	whether	naturalness	will	eventually	be	abandoned.	This	again	shows	that	it	is	much	more	specific	than	the	usual	pragmatic	values	of	model	preference.							
8.	Conclusion		Let	us	sum	up	the	main	results	of	our	paper.	First,	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson	and	the	confirmation	of	the	SM	were	less	expected	than	is	often	assumed.	With	the	growing	evidence	that	the	newly	discovered	particle	has	properties	consistent	with	the	SM	expectations,	most	physicists	accepted	it	to	be	a	Higgs,	and	at	least	tentatively,	a	SM	Higgs	boson.	This	does	not	contradict	the	fact	that	searches	for	possible	deviations	from	the	SM	will	be	ongoing	for	a	long	time.	Second,	the	Higgs	discovery	represented	a	crucial	experiment	for	the	SM	if	one	interprets	the	notion	in	a	sense	that	is	appropriate	for	modern	experiments.	An	experiment	as	complex	as	LHC	cannot	be	properly	understood	without	its	embedding	into	a	tradition	of	previous	precision	experiment	and	the	tradition	of	reliable	and	established	experimental	strategies.	These	are	crucial	for	keeping	underdetermination	at	bay.	Third,	our	case	study	suggests	that	criteria	of	theory	choice	be	understood	as	epistemic	and	pragmatic	values	that	have	to	be	weighed	in	in	factual	practice.	The	Higgs	discovery	led	to	a	certain	shift	from	pragmatic	to	epistemic	values	as	regards	the	mechanisms	of	EWSB.	Complex	criteria,	such	as	naturalness,	combine	different	values	without	becoming	inconsistent	or	inapplicable	by	the	scientific	community.			
Appendix	1	List	of	interview	partners	
	
March	&	April	2011	
	Prof.	V.Sharma	 UC	San	Diego,	USA	 experimentalist	 Convenor	of	Higgs	group	in		CMS	expt.	 Male	Prof.	F.Gianotti	 CERN	 experimentalist	 Spokeswoman	of	ATLAS	expt.	 	Female	Prof.	G.Tonelli	 U	of	Pisa	(Italy)	 experimentalist	 Spokesman	of	CMS	expt.	 Male	Prof.	A.Golutvin	 IC	London	(UK)	 experimentalist	 Spokesman	of	LHCb	expt.	 Male	Dr.	J.Boyd	 CERN	 experimentalist	 Coordinator	data	preparation	in	ATLAS	expt.		 Male	Prof.	J.Ellis	 CERN	 theorist	 	 Male	Prof.	C.Quigg	 Fermilab	(USA)	 theorist	 	 Male	Prof.	M.Mangano	 CERN	 theorist	 	 Male	Dr.	M.Mihalla	 KIT	(Germany)	 theorist	 	 Female	
	
	
Fall	2012	
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Prof.	M.Krämer	 RWTH	Aachen	 theorist	 	 Male	Prof.	L.Feld	 RWTH	Aachen	 experimentalist	 	 Male	Dr.	L.	Di	Luzio	 KIT	(Germany)	 theorist	 	 Male		Dr.	F.	Domingo	 KIT	(Germany)	 theorist	 	 Male	Prof.	C.Issever	 U	of	Oxford	(UK)	 experimentalist	 Convenor	exotics	ATLAS	expt.	 Female	Dr.	M.Mihalla	 KIT	(Germany)	 theorist	 	 Female	
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Appendix	2:	List	of	questions	in	questionnaires	
	
In	2011			
	
1. What	is	your	personal	estimate	of	the	probability	of	the	following	
scenarios?	The	LHC	will...	
a. find	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	boson	
b. rule	out	the	Standard	Model	Higgs	boson	
c. find	indisputable	evidence	of	new	physics	The	probabilities	to	be	assigned	were	in	20%	intervals,	i.e.	0-20,	20-40%,	…….			
2. Assuming	that	the	LHC	finds	new	physics,	which	(if	any)	of	the	following	
models	do	you	think	has	the	best	chances	of	explaining	it	a. extended	Higgs	sector	b. supersymmetry	c. extra-dimensions	d. dynamical	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	e. 4th	generation	f. extended	gauge	symmetry	(Z’,	Little	Higgs)	g. string	theory	h. other	i. None	of	those,	but	something	totally	unexpected	j. I	don’t	know	The	questionnaire	asked	for	two	ranked	choices.		
3. Independently	of	your	expectations	regarding	LHC	results,	which	(if	any)	of	
the	following	models	do	you	prefer?	a. extended	Higgs	sector	b. supersymmetry	c. extra-dimensions	d. dynamical	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	e. 4th	generation	f. extended	gauge	symmetry	(Z’,	Little	Higgs)	g. string	theory	h. other	i. I	don’t	know	The	questionnaire	asked	for	two	ranked	choices.	
	
4. Which	(if	any)	of	the	following	criteria	have	guided	you	in	answering	the	
previous	question?	(Four	ranked	answers	were	possible.)	a. The	model	solves	naturalness/hierarchy	problem	b. The	model	is	simple	c. The	model	will	provide	a	better	fit	to	the	data	d. The	model	is	elegant	e. The	model	makes	very	specific	predictions	f. The	model	allows	the	unification	of	forces	g. The	model	has	a	candidate	for	dark	matter	h. other	i. none	of	the	above	
	
5. Which	(if	any)	are	the	most	critical	flaws	of	the	Standard	Model?	(up	to	
three	answers	possible)			a. too	many	independent	parameters	b. small	but	nonzero	neutrino	masses	
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c. replication	of	fermion	families	d. different	magnitude	of	scales	of	fermion	masses	e. quadratic	divergences	in	corrections	to	Higgs	mass	f. left-right	asymmetry	g. gravity	is	not	included	h. no	unification	of	strong	and	electroweak	forces	i. CP	violation	j. No	dark	matter	candidate		
6. In	which	of	the	following	signatures	(if	any)	do	you	think	the	LHC	will	most	
likely	find	new	physics?	a. signatures	with	bottom	quarks	b. signatures	with	top	quarks	c. signatures	with	tau	leptons	d. signatures	with	missing	energy	e. signatures	with	multi	–	jet	topologies	f. signatures	with	multi	–	lepton	topologies	g. soft	events	h. other	i. I	don’t	know	Two	ranked	choices	were	asked	for	
	
7. How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	LHC	results	will	be	
very	important	to	understand…	a. strong	interactions	b. flavour	physics	c. origin	of	mass	d. quantum	gravitational	effects	e. dark	matter	f. dark	energy	g. cosmology	of	the	early	universe	The	answers	should	be	given	for	each	field	in	terms	of	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	‘undecided’,	‘somewhat	disagree’,	‘fully	disagree’	
	
8. How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	a. There	is	plenty	of	dialogue	between	theoretical	and	experimental	physicists	on	LHC	physics	b. Theorists	are	fully	prepared	to	tackle	future	new	data	from	LHC	c. Theorists	are	making	helpful	suggestions	on	how	to	collect	and	analyse	LHC	data	d. Experimental	physicists	are	sufficiently	taking	into	account	suggestions	from	theorists	e. Experimental	physicists	are	presenting	their	results	in	the	most	helpful	way	for	theorists	The	answers	should	be	given	for	each	field	in	terms	of	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	‘undecided’,	‘somewhat	disagree’,	‘fully	disagree’	
	
In	2012	
	
1. How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	After	the	discovery	
of	the	new	particle	at	125	GeV,	the	LHC	will…	a. confirm	the	minimal	Higgs	sector	b. find	a	more	complicated	Higgs	sector	c. find	an	alternative	mechanism	for	EWSB	
42		
d. find	indisputable	evidence	of	new	physics		The	answers	should	be	given	for	each	field	in	terms	of	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	‘undecided’,	‘somewhat	disagree’,	‘fully	disagree’		
2. Assuming	that	the	LHC	finds	new	physics,	which	(if	any)	of	the	following	
models	do	you	think	has	the	best	chances	of	explaining	it	
a. extended	Higgs	sector	
b. supersymmetry	
c. extra-dimensions	
d. dynamical	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	
e. 4th	generation	
f. extended	gauge	symmetry	(Z’,	Little	Higgs)	
g. string	theory	
h. other	
i. None	of	those,	but	something	totally	unexpected	
j. I	don’t	know															Only	one	choice	was	possible		
3. Independently	of	your	expectations	regarding	LHC	results,	which	(if	any)	of	
the	following	models	do	you	prefer?	a. extended	Higgs	sector	b. supersymmetry	c. extra-dimensions	d. dynamical	electroweak	symmetry	breaking	e. 4th	generation	f. extended	gauge	symmetry	(Z’,	Little	Higgs)	g. string	theory	h. other	i. I	don’t	know	Only	one	choice	possible			
4. Which	(if	any)	of	the	following	criteria	have	guided	you	in	answering	the	
previous	question?	a. The	model	solves	naturalness/hierarchy	problem	b. The	model	is	simple	c. The	model	will	provide	a	better	fit	to	the	data	d. The	model	is	elegant	e. The	model	makes	very	specific	predictions	f. The	model	allows	the	unification	of	forces	g. The	model	has	a	candidate	for	dark	matter	h. other	i. none	of	the	above																Up	to	three	answers	were	asked	for		
5. Which	(if	any)	are	the	most	critical	flaws	of	the	Standard	Model?	(up	to	
three	answers	possible)			a. too	many	independent	parameters	b. small	but	nonzero	neutrino	masses	c. replication	of	fermion	families	d. different	magnitude	of	scales	of	fermion	masses	e. quadratic	divergencies	in	corrections	to	Higgs	mass	f. left-right	asymmetry	g. gravity	is	not	included	h. no	unification	of	strong	and	electroweak	forces	
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i. CP	violation	j. No	dark	matter	candidate		
6. In	which	of	the	following	signatures	(if	any)	do	you	think	the	LHC	will	most	
likely	find	new	physics?	a. signatures	with	bottom	quarks	b. signatures	with	top	quarks	c. signatures	with	tau	leptons	d. signatures	with	missing	energy	e. signatures	with	multi	–	jet	topologies	f. signatures	with	multi	–	lepton	topologies	g. soft	events	h. other	i. I	don’t	know	Two	ranked	choices	were	asked	for		
7. How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	LHC	results	will	be	
very	important	to	understand…	a. strong	interactions	b. flavour	physics	c. origin	of	mass	d. quantum	gravitational	effects	e. dark	matter	f. dark	energy	g. cosmology	of	the	early	universe	The	answers	should	be	given	for	each	field	in	terms	of	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	‘undecided’,	‘somewhat	disagree’,	‘fully	disagree’		
8. How	much	do	you	agree	with	the	following	statements?	a. There	is	plenty	of	dialogue	between	theoretical	and	experimental	physicists	on	LHC	physics	b. Theorists	are	fully	prepared	to	tackle	future	new	data	from	LHC	c. Theorists	are	making	helpful	suggestions	on	how	to	collect	and	analyse	LHC	data	d. Experimental	physicists	are	sufficiently	taking	into	account	suggestions	from	theorists	e. Experimental	physicists	are	presenting	their	results	in	the	most	helpful	way	for	theorists	The	answers	should	be	given	for	each	field	in	terms	of	‘fully	agree’,	‘somewhat	agree’,	‘undecided’,	‘somewhat	disagree’,	‘fully	disagree’			
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